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Abstract
Recently, the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary has received a lot
of attention. Given a shared n-bit weak random source X with min-entropy k and a security
parameter s, the main goal is to construct an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol
that achieves entropy loss O(s). Dodis and Wichs [DW09] showed that optimal protocols can
be achieved by constructing explicit non-malleable extractors. However, the best known explicit
non-malleable extractor only achieves k = 0.49n [Li12b] and evidence in [Li12b] suggests that
constructing explicit non-malleable extractors for smaller min-entropy may be hard. In an
alternative approach, Li [Li12a] introduced the notion of a non-malleable condenser and showed
that explicit non-malleable condensers also give optimal privacy amplification protocols.
In this paper, we give the first construction of non-malleable condensers for arbitrary min-
entropy. Using our construction, we obtain a 2-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal
entropy loss for security parameter up to s = Ω(
√
k). This is the first protocol that simultane-
ously achieves optimal round complexity and optimal entropy loss for arbitrary min-entropy k.
We also generalize this result to obtain a protocol that runs in O(s/
√
k) rounds with optimal
entropy loss, for security parameter up to s = Ω(k). This significantly improves the protocol in
[CKOR10]. Finally, we give a better non-malleable condenser for linear min-entropy, and in this
case obtain a 2-round protocol with optimal entropy loss for security parameter up to s = Ω(k),
which improves the entropy loss and communication complexity of the protocol in [Li12b].
∗Supported by a Simons postdoctoral fellowship.
1 Introduction
Modern cryptographic applications rely heavily on the use of randomness. Indeed, without true
randomness some basic tasks such as bit commitment and encryption would become impossible.
However, most of these applications require uniform random bits, yet real world random sources are
rarely uniformly distributed. In addition, even initially uniform secret keys could be damaged by side
channel attacks of an adversary. Naturally, the random sources we can use become imperfect, and it
is therefore important to study how to run cryptographic applications using imperfect randomness.
In this general context, Bennett, Brassard, and Robert [BBR88] introduced the basic cryp-
tographic question of privacy amplification. Consider the simple model where two parties (Alice
and Bob) share an n-bit secret key X, which is weakly random. They also share a public channel
which is monitored by an adversary Eve, and have access to local (non-shared) uniform private
random bits. The goal now is for Alice and Bob to communicate over the channel to transform X
into a nearly uniform secret key, so that Eve has negligible information about it. To measure the
randomness in X, we use the standard min-entropy.
Definition 1.1. The min-entropy of a random variable X is
H∞(X) = min
x∈supp(X)
log2(1/Pr[X = x]).
For X ∈ {0, 1}n, we call X an (n,H∞(X))-source, and we say X has entropy rate H∞(X)/n.
We assume the adversary Eve has unlimited computational power. If Eve is passive, then this
problem can be solved by using a well-studied combinatorial object called “strong extractor”.
Notation. We let [s] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , s}. For ℓ a positive integer, Uℓ denotes the uniform
distribution on {0, 1}ℓ, and for S a set, US denotes the uniform distribution on S. When used as
a component in a vector, each Uℓ or US is assumed independent of the other components. We say
W ≈ε Z if the random variablesW and Z have distributions which are ε-close in variation distance.
Definition 1.2. A function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a strong (k, ε)-extractor if for every
source X with min-entropy k and independent Y which is uniform on {0, 1}d,
(Ext(X,Y ), Y ) ≈ε (Um, Y ).
Once we have a strong extractor, we can have Alice sample a fresh random string Y and send
it to Bob. They then both compute Ext(X,Y ). Since Eve only sees Y , the property of the strong
extractor guarantees that the output is close to uniform even given this information. However, if
Eve is active, then the problem becomes much harder and the above simple solution fails. In this
case, there has been a lot of effort in trying to achieve optimal parameters [MW97, DKRS06, DW09,
RW03, KR09, CKOR10, DLWZ11, CRS12, Li12a, Li12b]. More specifically, [MW97] gave the first
non-trivial protocol which takes one-round and works when the entropy rate of X is bigger than
2/3. [DKRS06] later improved this to work for entropy rate bigger than 1/2, yet both these results
suffer from the drawback that the final secret key R is significantly shorter than the min-entropy of
X. [DW09] showed that it is impossible to construct one-round protocol for entropy rate less than
1/2. The first protocol which works for entropy rate below 1/2 appeared in [RW03], which was
simplified by [KR09] and shown to run in O(s) rounds and achieve entropy loss O(s2), where s is
the security parameter of the protocol (A protocol has security parameter s if Eve cannot predict
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with advantage more than 2−s over random. When Eve is active, we also require that Eve cannot
make Alice and Bob output different secrets and not abort with probability more than 2−s).
[DW09] improved the number of rounds to 2 but the entropy loss remains O(s2). [CKOR10]
improved the entropy loss to O(s) but the number of rounds blows up to O(s). The natural open
question is therefore whether there is a 2-round protocol with entropy loss O(s). In the special case
where the entropy rate is bigger than 1/2, [DLWZ11, CRS12, Li12a] gave 2-round protocols with
entropy loss O(s). For any constant 0 < δ < 1, [DLWZ11] also gave a protocol for k = δn that
runs in poly(1/δ) rounds with entropy loss poly(1/δ)s = O(s). Recently, [Li12b] gave an improved
protocol for k = δn that runs in 2 rounds and achieves optimal entropy loss 2poly(1/δ)s = O(s).
In [DW09], Dodis and Wichs introduced the notion of a “non-malleable extractor” and showed
that such an object can be used to construct 2-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal
entropy loss.
Definition 1.3. 1 A function nmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor
if, for any source X with H∞(X) ≥ k and any function A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d such that A(y) 6= y
for all y, the following holds. When Y is chosen uniformly from {0, 1}d and independent of X,
(nmExt(X,Y ), nmExt(X,A(Y )), Y ) ≈ε (Um, nmExt(X,A(Y )), Y ).
Dodis and Wichs showed that non-malleable extractors exist when k > 2m+3 log(1/ε)+log d+9
and d > log(n−k+1)+2 log(1/ε)+7. However, they only constructed weaker forms of non-malleable
extractors. The first explicit construction of non-malleable extractors appears in [DLWZ11], which
works for entropy k > n/2. Later, various improvements appear in [CRS12, Li12a, DY12]. However,
the entropy requirement remains k > n/2. Recently, Li [Li12b] gave the first explicit non-malleable
extractor that breaks this barrier, which works for k = (1/2 − δ)n for some constant δ > 0.
[Li12b] also showed a connection between non-malleable extractors and two-source extractors, which
suggests that constructing explicit non-malleable extractors for smaller entropy may be hard.
Given the above background, an alternative approach seems promising. This is the notion of
a non-malleable condenser introduced in [Li12a]. While a non-malleable extractor requires the
output to be close to uniform, a non-malleable condenser only requires the output to have enough
min-entropy.
Definition 1.4. [Li12b] A (k, k′, ǫ) non-malleable condenser is a function nmCond : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m such that given any (n, k)-source X, an independent uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1}d,
and any (deterministic) function A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d such that ∀y,A(y) 6= y, we have that with
probability 1− ǫ over the fixing of Y = y,
Pr
z′←nmCond(X,A(y))
[nmCond(X, y)|nmCond(X,A(y))=z′ is ǫ− close to an (m,k′) source] ≥ 1− ǫ.
As can be seen from the definition, a non-malleable condenser is a strict relaxation of a non-
malleable extractor. In [Li12a], Li showed that non-malleable condensers can also be used to
construct 2-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss. Thus one can hope to
construct explicit non-malleable condensers for smaller min-entropy.
1Following [DLWZ11], we define worst case non-malleable extractors, which is slightly different from the original
definition of average case non-malleable extractors in [DW09]. However, the two definitions are essentially equivalent
up to a small change of parameters.
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1.1 Our results
In this paper, we indeed succeed in the above approach. We construct explicit non-malleable
condensers for essentially any min-entropy. Our first theorem is as follows.
Theorem 1.5. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for any n, k ∈ N and s > 0 with k ≥
C(log n+ s)2, there is an explicit (k, s, 2−s)-non-malleable condenser with seed length
d = O(log n+ s)2 and output length m = O(log n+ s)2.
Combining this theorem with the protocol in [Li12a], we immediately obtain a 2-round privacy
amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss for any security parameter up to Ω(
√
k). This is the
first explicit protocol that simultaneously achieves optimal parameters in both round complexity
and entropy loss, for arbitrary min-entropy.
Theorem 1.6. There exists a constant C such that for any ǫ > 0 with k ≥ C(log n + log(1/ǫ))2,
there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol for (n, k) sources with security param-
eter log(1/ǫ), entropy loss O(log n+ log(1/ǫ)) and communication complexity O(log n+ log(1/ǫ))2.
We note that except the protocol in [CKOR10], all previous results that work for arbitrary
min-entropy k only achieve security parameter up to s = Ω(
√
k) like our protocol and all of them
have entropy loss Ω(s2). In this paper, we finally manage to reduce the entropy loss to O(s). Thus,
for this range of security parameter, ignoring the communication complexity, we essentially obtain
optimal privacy amplification protocols.
For the special case where k = δn for some constant 0 < δ < 1, we can do better. Here we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 1.7. For any constant 0 < δ < 1 and k = δn there exists a constant C = 2poly(1/δ) such
that given any 0 < s ≤ k/C, there is an explicit (k, s, 2−s)-non-malleable condenser with seed length
d = poly(1/δ)(log n+ s) and output length m = 2poly(1/δ)(log n+ s).
Combined with the protocol in [Li12a], this theorem yields:
Theorem 1.8. There exists an absolute constant C0 > 1 such that for any constant 0 < δ < 1
and k = δn there exists a constant C1 = 2
poly(1/δ) such that given any ǫ > 0 with C1 log(1/ǫ) ≤ k,
there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol for (n, k) sources with security param-
eter log(1/ǫ), entropy loss C0(log n + log(1/ǫ)) and communication complexity poly(1/δ)(log n +
log(1/ǫ)).
Note that for security parameter s, the 2-round protocol for k = δn in [Li12b] has entropy loss
2poly(1/δ)s and communication complexity 2poly(1/δ)s. Here, we improve the entropy loss to C0s for
an absolute constant C0 > 1 and the communication complexity to poly(1/δ)s.
Finally, one can ask what if for arbitrary min-entropy k, we want to achieve security parameter
bigger than
√
k, as in [CKOR10]. Using our techniques combined with some techniques from
[CKOR10], we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1.9. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any n, k ∈ N with k ≥ log4 n and any ǫ >
0 with k ≥ C(log(1/ǫ)) there exists an explicit O((log n+log(1/ǫ))/√k) round privacy amplification
protocol for (n, k) sources with security parameter log(1/ǫ), entropy loss O(log n + log(1/ǫ)) and
communication complexity O((log n+ log(1/ǫ))
√
k).
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Thus, we can essentially achieve security parameter up to s = Ω(k) with optimal entropy loss,
at the price of increasing the number of rounds to O(s/
√
k). Note that the protocol in [CKOR10],
though also achieving optimal entropy loss, runs in Ω(s) rounds. Thus our protocol improves their
round complexity by a
√
k factor. For large k this is a huge improvement, especially in practice.
Table 1 summarizes our results compared to some previous results, assuming the security pa-
rameter is s.
Construction Entropy of W Security parameter Rounds Entropy loss
Optimal, non-explicit k > log n s ≤ Ω(k) 2 Θ(s+ log n)
[MW97] k > 2n/3 s = Θ(k) 1 (n− k)
[DKRS06] k > n/2 s = Θ(k) 1 (n− k)
[RW03, KR09] k ≥ polylog(n) s ≤ Ω(√k) Θ(s+ log n) Θ((s+ log n)2)
[DW09] k ≥ polylog(n) s ≤ Ω(√k) 2 Θ((s+ log n)2)
[CKOR10] k ≥ polylog(n) s ≤ Ω(k) Θ(s+ log n) Θ(s+ log n)
[DLWZ11] k ≥ δn s ≤ k/poly(1/δ) poly(1/δ) poly(1/δ)(s + log n)
[Li12b] k ≥ δn s ≤ k/2poly(1/δ) 2 2poly(1/δ)(s+ log n)
This work k ≥ polylog(n) s ≤ Ω(√k) 2 Θ(s+ log n)
This work k ≥ polylog(n) s ≤ Ω(k) Θ((s+ log n)/√k) Θ(s+ log n)
This work k ≥ δn s ≤ k/2poly(1/δ) 2 Θ(s+ log n)
Table 1: Summary of Results on Privacy Amplification with an Active Adversary
2 Overview of The Constructions and Techniques
Here we give an informal overview of our constructions and the technique used. To give a clear
description, we shall be imprecise sometimes.
2.1 Non-malleable condenser for arbitrary min-entropy
For an (n, k) source X, our non-malleable condenser uses a uniform seed Y = (Y1, Y2), where Y2 has
a bigger size than Y1, say |Y1| = d and |Y2| = 10d. Consider now any functionA(Y ) = Y ′ = (Y ′1 , Y ′2).
In the following we will use letters with prime to denote variables produced with Y ′. Since Y ′ 6= Y ,
we have two cases: Y1 = Y
′
1 or Y1 6= Y ′1 . The output of our non-malleable condenser will be
Z = nmCond(X,Y ) = (V1, V2). Intuitively, V1 handles the case where Y1 = Y
′
1 and V2 handles the
case where Y1 6= Y ′1 . We now describe the two cases separately.
If Y1 = Y
′
1 , then we take a strong extractor Ext and compute W = Ext(X,Y1). Note that
W ′ = W since Y1 = Y ′1 . Note Y
′ 6= Y , thus we must have Y ′2 6= Y2. We now fix Y1 (and Y ′1) and
conditioned on this fixing, W =W ′ is still (close to) uniform and now Y ′2 is a deterministic function
of Y2. At this point, we can take any non-malleable extractor nmExt from [DLWZ11, CRS12, Li12a]
and compute V1 = nmExt(W,Y2). Since W is uniform, by the property of the non-malleable
extractor we have that V1 is (close to) uniform even conditioned on the fixing of V
′
1 and (Y2, Y
′
2).
Now let the size of V1 be bigger than the size of V2, say |V1| ≥ |V2|+s. Thus the further conditioning
on the fixing of V ′2 will still leave V1 with entropy roughly s. This takes care of our first case.
If Y1 6= Y ′1 , then we first fix (Y1, Y ′1). Note that fixing Y ′1 may cause Y2 to lose entropy. However,
since |Y2| = 10|Y1|, conditioned on this fixing Y2 still has entropy rate roughly 9/10, and now Y ′2
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is a deterministic function of Y2. We further fix W
′, which is now a deterministic function of X.
As long as the entropy of X is larger than the size of W , conditioned on this fixing X still has a
lot of entropy. Note that after these fixings X and Y2 are still independent. Now, we use X and Y2
to perform an alternating extraction protocol. Specifically, take the first 3d bits of Y2 to be S0, we
compute the following random variables: R0 = Raz(S0,X), S1 = Ext(Y2, R0), R1 = Ext(X,S1), S2 =
Ext(Y2, R1), R2 = Ext(X,S2), · · · , St = Ext(Y2, Rt−1), Rt = Ext(X,St). Here Raz is the two source
extractor in [Raz05], which works as long as the first source has entropy rate > 1/2, and Ext is
a strong extractor. We take t = 4d and let each Ri output s bits. Note that in the first step S0
roughly has entropy rate 2/3, thus we need to use the two-source extractor Raz. In all subsequent
steps Si, Ri are (close to) uniform, thus it suffices to use a strong extractor.
In the above alternating extraction protocol, as long as the size of each (Si, Ri) is relatively
small, one can show that for any i, Ri is (close to) uniform conditioned on {Rj , R′j , j < i} and
(Y2, Y
′
2) (recall {R′j} are the random variables produced by Y ′2 instead of Y2). Next, we borrow
some ideas from [DW09]. Specifically, there they showed an efficient map f from a string with d bits
to a subset of [4d], such that for any µ ∈ {0, 1}d, |f(µ)| = 2d. Moreover, for any µ 6= µ′, there exists
a j ∈ [4d] such that |f(µ)≥j| > |f(µ′)≥j |, where f(µ)≥j denotes the subset of f(µ) which contains
all the elements ≥ j. Now, let R = (R1, · · · , Rt), we define a “look-ahead” MAC laMAC such that
for any µ ∈ {0, 1}d, laMACR(µ) = {Ri}i∈f(µ). Now our V2 is computed as V2 = laMACR(Y1). Note
that since we have fixed (Y1, Y
′
1), we can now view them as two different strings in {0, 1}d. Thus,
there exists a j ∈ [4d] such that |f(Y1)≥j | > |f(Y ′1)≥j |. Now let R¯ be the concatenation of those
Ri’s in V2 with i ≥ j and R¯′ be the corresponding variable for V ′2 , then the size of R¯ is bigger than
the size of R¯′ by at least s. Moreover, R¯ is (close to) uniform conditioned on the fixing of {R′i, i < j}
and (Y2, Y
′
2). Thus R¯ roughly has entropy s even conditioned on the fixing of R¯
′, {R′i, i < j} and
(Y2, Y
′
2), which also determines V
′
2 . Since we have fixed W
′ before, V ′1 is also fixed. Thus we have
that Z has entropy roughly s even conditioned on the fixing of Z ′ and (Y2, Y ′2). This takes care of
our second case.
Thus, we obtain a non-malleable condenser for any min-entropy. However, since in the alter-
nating extraction protocol each Ri outputs s bits, and we need d = Ω(s) to achieve error 2
−s, the
entropy of X has to be larger than 4ds = Ω(s2). Thus we can only achieve s up to Ω(
√
k).
2.2 Privacy amplification protocol
Combined with the techniques in [Li12b], our non-malleable condenser immediately gives a 2-
round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss for any min-entropy, with security
parameter s up to Ω(
√
k). To better illustrate the key idea, we also give a slightly simpler 2-round
protocol with optimal entropy loss, without using the non-malleable condenser. Assuming the
security parameter we want to achieve is s, we now describe the protocol.
In the first round, Alice samples 3 random strings (Y1, Y2, Y3) from her private random bits
and sends them to Bob, where Bob receives (Y ′1 , Y
′
2 , Y
′
3). Assume that |Y1| = d, |Y2| = 10d, |Y3| =
50d. Take a strong extractor Ext and Alice and Bob each computes R1 = Ext(X,Y1) and R
′
1 =
Ext(X,Y ′1) respectively. R1, R
′
1 each has 4s bits. Next, Alice and Bob each uses (X,Y2) and
(X,Y ′2) to perform the alternating extraction protocol we described above, where they compute
R2 = (R21, · · · , R2t) and R′2 = (R′21, · · · , R′2t) respectively, with t = 4d. Using R2 and R′2, they
compute Z = laMACR2(Y1) and Z
′ = laMACR′
2
(Y ′1) respectively.
In the second round, Bob samples a random stringW ′ from his private random bits and sends it
to Alice, where Alice receives W . Together with W ′, Bob also sends two tags (T ′1, T
′
2), where Alice
5
receives (T1, T2). For T
′
1, Bob takes the two-source extractor Raz and computes T
′
1 = Raz(Y
′
3 , Z
′).
Let T ′1 output s bits. For T
′
2, Bob takes a standard message authentication code (MAC) and
computes T ′2 = MACR′1(W
′), using R′1 as the key. Bob then computes RB = Ext(X,W
′) as the final
output. Alice will check whether T1 = Raz(Y3, Z) and T2 = MACR1(W ). If either test fails, Alice
rejects. Otherwise Alice computes RA = Ext(X,W ) as the final output.
As before, the analysis can be divided into two cases: Y1 = Y
′
1 and Y1 6= Y ′1 . In the first case,
we have R1 = R
′
1 and is (close to) uniform and private. Thus R1 can be used in the MAC to
authenticate W ′ to Alice. Although T ′1 may give some information about R1, note that R1 has size
4s and T ′1 has size s. Thus even conditioned on T
′
1, R1 has entropy roughly 3s. We note that the
MAC works as long as the entropy rate of R1 is bigger than 1/2. Thus in this case Bob can indeed
authenticate W ′ to Alice and they will agree on a uniform and private final output.
In the second case, again we can first fix (Y1, Y
′
1) and R
′
1. As before we have that after this
fixing, Y2 still has entropy rate roughly 9/10, X still has a lot of entropy, and X is independent
of (Y2, Y3). Now we can view (Y1, Y
′
1) as two different strings and by the same analysis before,
Z roughly has entropy s conditioned on the fixing of Z ′ and (Y2, Y ′2). Note that after this fixing
Y3 still has entropy rate > 1/2, and Y
′
3 is a deterministic function of Y3. Since Raz is a strong
two-source extractor, we have that Raz(Y3, Z) is (close to) uniform conditioned on (Y
′
3 , Z
′, R′1,W
′),
which determines (T ′1, T
′
2). Thus, in this case Alice will reject with probability 1 − 2−s, since the
probability that Eve guesses Raz(Y3, Z) correctly is at most 2
−s.
We note that our protocol shares some similarities with the protocol in [DW09], as they both use
the alternating extraction protocol and the “look-ahead” MAC. However, there is one important
difference. The protocol in [DW09] uses the look-ahead MAC to authenticate the string W ′ that
Bob sends to Alice in the second round. The look-ahead MAC has size Ω(s2) and is revealed in the
second round, which causes an entropy loss of Ω(s2). Our protocol, on the other hand, uses the
look-ahead MAC to authenticate the string Y1 that Alice sends to Bob in the first round. Although
in the protocol we do compute some variables that have size Ω(s2) (namely (Z,Z ′)), they are
computed locally by Alice and Bob, and are never revealed in the protocol to Eve. Instead, what
is revealed to Eve is T ′1 = Raz(Y
′
3 , Z
′), which only has size O(s). In other words, in the case where
Y1 6= Y ′1 , since we know that Z has entropy s conditioned on Z ′, we can apply another extractor
Raz to Z and Z ′ respectively, such that the resulting variable T ′1 only has size O(s) and Raz(Y3, Z)
is (close to) uniform conditioned on T ′1. This brings the entropy loss down to O(s).
One might think that the same trick can also be applied to the protocol in [DW09]. However,
this is not the case. The reason is that conditioned on (Y, Y ′), all the random variables in our
protocol that are used to authenticate W ′ are (R1, T1, R′1, T
′
1), which are deterministic functions of
X and have size O(s). Thus in the case where Bob successfully authenticates W ′ to Alice, we can
fix them and conditioned on the fixing, X and W are still independent. This results in a protocol
with optimal entropy loss. In the protocol in [DW09], conditioned on (Y, Y ′), the random variables
that are used to authenticate W ′ include the output of the look-ahead extractor, which has size
Ω(s2). Thus conditioning on this random variable will cause X to lose entropy Ω(s2). On the other
hand, we cannot simply apply another extractor to this MAC to reduce the output size, since then
the output will be a function of W and X, and thus conditioned on the fixing of it W and X will
no longer be independent.
We now describe our protocol for security parameter s >
√
k. The very high level strategy is
as follows. At the beginning of the protocol, Alice samples a random string Y from her private
random bits with d1 = O(s) bits and sends it to Bob, where Bob receives Y
′. They each compute
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R = Ext(X,Y ) and R′ = Ext(X,Y ′) respectively, by using a strong extractor Ext. At the end
of the protocol, Bob samples a random string W ′ from his private random bits with d1 bits and
sends it to Alice, together with a tag T = MACR′(W
′). Alice receives (W,T ). Bob will compute
RB = Ext(X,W
′) as his final output and Alice will check if T = MACR(W ). If the test fails then
Alice rejects. Otherwise she will compute RA = Ext(X,W ) as her final output. In the case where
Y = Y ′, again we will have that R = R′ and is uniform and private. Thus in this case Bob can
authenticate W ′ to Alice by using a MAC and R′ as the key. We will now modify the protocol to
ensure that if Y 6= Y ′, then with probability 1− 2−s either Alice or Bob will reject.
If s <
√
k then we can use our 2-round protocol described above. However, we want to achieve
s >
√
k and X does not have enough entropy for the 2-round protocol. On the other hand, we
note that we can still use the 2-round protocol to send a substring of Y with s′ = Ω(
√
k) bits to
Bob, such that if Eve changes this string, then with probability 1− 2−s′ Alice will reject. The key
observation now is that after running this 2-round protocol, conditioned on the transcript, X only
loses O(s′) entropy. Thus X still has entropy k −O(√k) in Eve’s view. Therefore, we can run the
2-round protocol again, using fresh random strings sampled from Alice’s private random bits. This
will send another substring of Y with s′ = Ω(
√
k) bits to Bob. As long as X has enough entropy,
we can keep doing this and it will take us O(s/
√
k) rounds to send the entire Y to Bob, while the
entropy loss is O(s′)O(s/
√
k) = O(s). Thus as long as k ≥ Cs for a sufficiently large constant C,
the above approach will work.
However, the simple idea described above is not enough. The reason is that to change Y , Eve
only needs to change one substring, and she can succeed with probability 2−s
′
>> 2−s. To fix
this, we modify the protocol to ensure that, if Eve changes Y to Y ′ 6= Y , then she has to change
Ω(s/
√
k) substrings, i.e., a constant fraction of the substrings. This is where we borrow some ideas
from [CKOR10]. Specifically, instead of having Alice just send substrings of Y to Bob, we will use
an asymptotically good code for edit errors and have Alice send substrings of the encoding of Y
to Bob. More specifically, let M = Edit(Y ) be the encoding of Y , which has size O(d1). At the
beginning of the protocol, Alice will send Y to Bob, where Bob receives Y ′. Next, our protocol
will run in L = O(s/
√
k) phases, with each phase consisting of two rounds. In phase i, Alice will
send the i’th substring Mi of M to Bob, where Mi has d2 = Θ(
√
k) bits. In the first round of
phase i, Alice samples two random strings (Yi2, Yi3) from her private random bits and sends them
to Bob, together withMi. Bob receives (M
′
i , Y
′
i2, Y
′
i3). We will let |Yi3| ≥ 10|Yi2|. As in the previous
2-round protocol, Alice will use X and Yi2 to perform an alternating extraction protocol, where
she computes Ri = (Ri1, · · · , Rit) with t = 4d2 and Zi = lrMACRi(Mi). Correspondingly, Bob
will compute R′i and Z
′
i = lrMACR′i(M
′
i), using X and Y
′
i2. In the second round, Bob will send
T ′i = Raz(Y
′
i3, Z
′
i) to Alice, where Alice receives Ti. Alice will now check if Ti = Raz(Yi3, Zi) and she
rejects if the test fails. By the same analysis of the 2-round protocol, if Eve changes the substring
Mi to M
′
i 6=Mi, then with probability 1− 2−Ω(
√
k) Alice will reject.
To synchronize between Alice and Bob, in the second round of phase i, we will also have Bob
sample a fresh random stringW ′i and send it as a challenge to Alice, together with T
′
i . Alice receives
(Wi, Ti). Now if Alice does not reject, then she will also compute a response Vi = Ext(X,Wi) and
send it back to Bob in the first round of phase i + 1. Bob will receive V ′i and then check if
V ′i = Ext(X,W
′
i ). If the test fails then he rejects. Otherwise he proceeds as before. At the end
of the protocol, Bob will first check if the received codeword M ′ = M ′1 ◦ · · · ◦M ′L is indeed equal
to Edit(Y ′). If the test fails he rejects. Otherwise he proceeds as before. This gives our whole
protocol.
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For the analysis, by the property of the code, if Eve wants to change M = Edit(Y ) to M ′ =
Edit(Y ′) with Y ′ 6= Y , then she has to make Ω(d1) edit operations (insertion, deletion or altering).
Since changing one substring costs at most
√
k edit operations, Eve has to change at least Ω(s/
√
k)
substrings. We then show that as long as X has an extra entropy of O(s), for a constant fraction
of these changes, conditioned on the event that Eve has successfully made all previous changes,
the probability that Eve can make this change successfully is at most 2−Ω(
√
k). Thus the overall
probability that Eve can change M to M ′ without causing either Alice or Bob to reject is at most
(2−Ω(
√
k))Ω(s/
√
k) = 2−Ω(s). The round complexity is O(s/
√
k) and the communication complexity
is O(s
√
k) since in each phase, the communication complexity is O(k).
2.3 Non-malleable condenser for linear min-entropy
Our non-malleable condenser for linear min-entropy is similar to the construction for arbitrary
min-entropy, except we use a different alternating extraction protocol, namely that in [Li12b].
Specifically, we will again use a seed Y = (Y1, Y2), where |Y1| = d and |Y2| ≥ 10d. The output will
also be Z = (V1, V2). For any function A(Y ) = Y ′ = (Y ′1 , Y ′2), we still have two cases: Y1 = Y ′1 or
Y1 6= Y ′1 .
If Y1 = Y
′
1 , then again we take a strong extractor Ext and compute W = Ext(X,Y1) and
V1 = nmExt(W,Y2). As long as |V1| ≥ |V2|+ s, this takes care of our first case.
If Y1 6= Y ′1 , then again we first fix (Y1, Y ′1) and W ′. Conditioned on this fixing Y2 still has
entropy rate roughly 9/10, and now Y ′2 is a deterministic function of Y2. Moreover X still has
a lot of entropy and is independent of Y2. Now we use the alternating extraction protocol in
[Li12b]. More specifically, since X has min-entropy k = δn we can apply a somewhere condenser
in [BKS+05, Raz05, Zuc07] to X and obtain X¯ = (X1, · · · ,XC) with C = poly(1/δ) such that at
least one Xi has entropy rate 0.9. In [Li12b], Li showed that as long as k ≥ 2poly(1/δ)s, one can use
X, X¯, Y1, Y2 to perform an alternating extraction protocol and obtain V2 with size 2
poly(1/δ)s, such
that when Y1 6= Y ′1 , V2 roughly has entropy s conditioned on the fixing of V ′2 and (Y2, Y ′2). Since
we have fixed (Y1, Y
′
1) and W
′ before, this means that Z roughly has entropy s conditioned on the
fixing of Z ′ and (Y, Y ′).
Combined with the protocol in [Li12a], we thus reduce the entropy loss of the protocol in [Li12b]
to O(s) for an absolute constant O(·) and the communication complexity to poly(1/δ)s.
Organization. After some preliminaries, we give the formal definition of the privacy amplification
problem in section 4. We define alternating extraction in section 5. We give our non-malleable
condenser for arbitrary min-entropy in section 6, and the general privacy amplification protocol in
section 7. In section 8 we give our non-malleable condenser for linear min-entropy. We conclude
with some open problems in section 9.
3 Preliminaries
We often use capital letters for random variables and corresponding small letters for their instan-
tiations. Let |S| denote the cardinality of the set S. All logarithms are to the base 2.
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3.1 Probability distributions
Definition 3.1 (statistical distance). LetW and Z be two distributions on a set S. Their statistical
distance (variation distance) is
∆(W,Z)
def
= max
T⊆S
(|W (T )− Z(T )|) = 1
2
∑
s∈S
|W (s)− Z(s)|.
We say W is ε-close to Z, denoted W ≈ε Z, if ∆(W,Z) ≤ ε. For a distribution D on a set S
and a function h : S → T , let h(D) denote the distribution on T induced by choosing x according
to D and outputting h(x).
3.2 Somewhere Random Sources, Extractors and Condensers
Definition 3.2 (Somewhere Random sources). A source X = (X1, · · · ,Xt) is (t × r) somewhere-
random (SR-source for short) if each Xi takes values in {0, 1}r and there is an i such that Xi is
uniformly distributed.
Definition 3.3. An elementary somewhere-k-source is a vector of sources (X1, · · · ,Xt), such that
some Xi is a k-source. A somewhere k-source is a convex combination of elementary somewhere-k-
sources.
Definition 3.4. A function C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k → l, ǫ)-condenser if for every
k-source X, C(X,Ud) is ǫ-close to some l-source. When convenient, we call C a rate-(k/n → l/m, ǫ)-
condenser.
Definition 3.5. A function C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k → l, ǫ)-somewhere-condenser
if for every k-source X, the vector (C(X, y)y∈{0,1}d ) is ǫ-close to a somewhere-l-source. When
convenient, we call C a rate-(k/n → l/m, ǫ)-somewhere-condenser.
Definition 3.6. A function TExt : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m is a strong two source extractor
for min-entropy k1, k2 and error ǫ if for every independent (n1, k1) source X and (n2, k2) source Y ,
|(TExt(X,Y ),X)− (Um,X)| < ǫ
and
|(TExt(X,Y ), Y )− (Um, Y )| < ǫ,
where Um is the uniform distribution on m bits independent of (X,Y ).
3.3 Average conditional min-entropy
Dodis and Wichs originally defined non-malleable extractors with respect to average conditional
min-entropy, a notion defined by Dodis, Ostrovsky, Reyzin, and Smith [DORS08].
Definition 3.7. The average conditional min-entropy is defined as
H˜∞(X|W ) = − log
(
Ew←W
[
max
x
Pr[X = x|W = w]
])
= − log
(
Ew←W
[
2−H∞(X|W=w)
])
.
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Average conditional min-entropy tends to be useful for cryptographic applications. By taking
W to be the empty string, we see that average conditional min-entropy is at least as strong as
min-entropy. In fact, the two are essentially equivalent, up to a small loss in parameters.
We have the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.8 ([DORS08]). For any s > 0, Prw←W [H∞(X|W = w) ≥ H˜∞(X|W )− s] ≥ 1− 2−s.
Lemma 3.9 ([DORS08]). If a random variable B has at most 2ℓ possible values, then H˜∞(A|B) ≥
H∞(A)− ℓ.
To clarify which notion of min-entropy and non-malleable extractor we mean, we use the term
worst-case non-malleable extractor when we refer to our Definition 1.3, which is with respect to
traditional (worst-case) min-entropy, and average-case non-malleable extractor to refer to he original
definition of Dodis and Wichs, which is with respect to average conditional min-entropy.
Corollary 3.10. A (k, ε)-average-case non-malleable extractor is a (k, ε)-worst-case non-malleable
extractor. For any s > 0, a (k, ε)-worst-case non-malleable extractor is a (k + s, ε+ 2−s)-average-
case non-malleable extractor.
Throughout the rest of our paper, when we say non-malleable extractor, we refer to the worst-
case non-malleable extractor of Definition 1.3.
3.4 Prerequisites from previous work
One-time message authentication codes (MACs) use a shared random key to authenticate a message
in the information-theoretic setting.
Definition 3.11. A function family {MACR : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}v} is a ǫ-secure one-time MAC for
messages of length d with tags of length v if for any w ∈ {0, 1}d and any function (adversary)
A : {0, 1}v → {0, 1}d × {0, 1}v ,
Pr
R
[MACR(W
′) = T ′ ∧W ′ 6= w | (W ′, T ′) = A(MACR(w))] ≤ ǫ,
where R is the uniform distribution over the key space {0, 1}ℓ.
Theorem 3.12 ([KR09]). For any message length d and tag length v, there exists an efficient
family of (⌈dv ⌉2−v)-secure MACs with key length ℓ = 2v. In particular, this MAC is ε-secure when
v = log d+ log(1/ǫ).
More generally, this MAC also enjoys the following security guarantee, even if Eve has partial
information E about its key R. Let (R,E) be any joint distribution. Then, for all attackers A1 and
A2,
Pr
(R,E)
[MACR(W
′) = T ′ ∧W ′ 6=W |W = A1(E),
(W ′, T ′) = A2(MACR(W ), E)] ≤
⌈
d
v
⌉
2v−H˜∞(R|E).
(In the special case when R ≡ U2v and independent of E, we get the original bound.)
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Remark 3.13. Note that the above theorem indicates that the MAC works even if the key R has
average conditional min-entropy rate > 1/2.
Sometimes it is convenient to talk about average case seeded extractors, where the source X has
average conditional min-entropy H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ k and the output of the extractor should be uniform
given Z as well. The following lemma is proved in [DORS08].
Lemma 3.14. [DORS08] For any δ > 0, if Ext is a (k, ǫ) extractor then it is also a (k+log(1/δ), ǫ+
δ) average case extractor.
Theorem 3.15 ([BKS+05, Raz05, Zuc07]). For any constant β, δ > 0, there is an efficient family
of rate-(δ → 1−β, ǫ = 2−Ω(n))-somewhere condensers Cond : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}m)D where D = O(1)
and m = Ω(n).
For a strong seeded extractor with optimal parameters, we use the following extractor con-
structed in [GUV09].
Theorem 3.16 ([GUV09]). For every constant α > 0, and all positive integers n, k and any ǫ > 0,
there is an explicit construction of a strong (k, ǫ)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with
d = O(log n + log(1/ǫ)) and m ≥ (1 − α)k. It is also a strong (k, ǫ) average case extractor with
m ≥ (1− α)k −O(log n+ log(1/ǫ)).
We need the following construction of strong two-source extractors in [Raz05].
Theorem 3.17 ([Raz05]). For any n1, n2, k1, k2,m and any 0 < δ < 1/2 with
• n1 ≥ 6 log n1 + 2 log n2
• k1 ≥ (0.5 + δ)n1 + 3 log n1 + log n2
• k2 ≥ 5 log(n1 − k1)
• m ≤ δmin[n1/8, k2/40] − 1
There is a polynomial time computable strong 2-source extractor Raz : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 →
{0, 1}m for min-entropy k1, k2 with error 2−1.5m.
Theorem 3.18. [DLWZ11, CRS12, Li12a] For every constant δ > 0, there exists a constant β > 0
such that for every n, k ∈ N with k ≥ (1/2 + δ)n and ǫ > 2−βn there exists an explicit (k, ǫ)
non-malleable extractor with seed length d = O(log n+ log ǫ−1) and output length m = Ω(n).
The following standard lemma about conditional min-entropy is implicit in [NZ96] and explicit
in [MW97].
Lemma 3.19 ([MW97]). Let X and Y be random variables and let Y denote the range of Y . Then
for all ǫ > 0, one has
Pr
Y
[
H∞(X|Y = y) ≥ H∞(X) − log |Y| − log
(
1
ǫ
)]
≥ 1− ǫ.
We also need the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.20. Let (X,Y ) be a joint distribution such that X has range X and Y has range Y.
Assume that there is another random variable X ′ with the same range as X such that |X−X ′| = ǫ.
Then there exists a joint distribution (X ′, Y ) such that |(X,Y )− (X ′, Y )| = ǫ
Proof. First let (X ′′, Y ) be the same probability distribution as (X,Y ). For any x ∈ X , let p′′x =
Pr[X ′′ = x] and p′x = Pr[X ′ = x]. For any y ∈ Y, let py = Pr[Y = y]. Let p′′xy = Pr[X ′′ = x, Y = y].
Let W = {x ∈ X : p′′x > p′x} and V = {x ∈ X : p′′x < p′x}. Thus we have that
∑
x∈W |p′′x − p′x| =∑
x∈V |p′′x − p′x| = ǫ.
We now gradually change the probability distribution X ′′ into X ′, while keeping the distribution
Y the same, as follows. While W is not empty or V is not empty, do the following.
1. Pick x ∈W ∪ V such that |p′′x − p′x| = min{|p′′x − p′x|, x ∈W ∪ V }.
2. If x ∈W , we decrease Pr[X ′′ = x] to p′x. Let τ = p′′x− p′x. To ensure this is still a probability
distribution, we also pick any x¯ ∈ V and increase Pr[X ′′ = x¯] to Pr[X ′′ = x¯] + τ . To
do this, we pick the elements y ∈ Y one by one in an arbitrary order and while τ > 0,
do the following. Let τ ′ = min(p′′xy, τ), Pr[X ′′ = x, Y = y] = Pr[X ′′ = x, Y = y] − τ ′,
Pr[X ′′ = x¯, Y = y] = Pr[X ′′ = x¯, Y = y] + τ ′ and τ = τ − τ ′. We then update the sets {p′′x}
and {p′′xy} accordingly. Note that since p′′x = τ + p′x ≥ τ , this process will indeed end when
τ = 0 and now Pr[X ′′ = x] = p′x. Note that after this change we still have that p′′¯x ≤ p′¯x. Also,
for any y ∈ Y the probability Pr[Y = y] remains unchanged. Finally, remove x from W and
if p′′¯x = p′¯x, remove x¯ from V .
3. If x ∈ V , we increase Pr[X ′′ = x] to p′x. Let τ = p′x − p′′x. To ensure that X ′′ is still a
probability distribution, we also pick any x¯ ∈W and decrease Pr[X ′′ = x¯] to Pr[X ′′ = x¯]− τ .
To do this, we pick the elements y ∈ Y one by one in an arbitrary order and while τ > 0,
do the following. Let τ ′ = min(p′′¯xy, τ), Pr[X ′′ = x, Y = y] = Pr[X ′′ = x, Y = y] + τ ′,
Pr[X ′′ = x¯, Y = y] = Pr[X ′′ = x¯, Y = y]− τ ′ and τ = τ − τ ′. We then update the sets {p′′x}
and {p′′xy} accordingly. Note that since p′′¯x ≥ τ + p′¯x, this process will indeed end when τ = 0
and we still have p′′¯x ≥ px¯. Also, for any y ∈ Y the probability Pr[Y = y] remains unchanged.
Finally, remove x from V and if p′′¯x = px¯, remove x¯ from W .
Note that in each iteration, at least one element will be removed fromW ∪V . Thus the iteration
will end after finite steps. When it ends, we have that ∀x,Pr[x′′ = x] = p′x, thus X ′′ = X ′. Since
in each step the probability Pr[Y = y] remains unchanged, the distribution Y remains the same.
Finally, it is clear from the algorithm that |(X ′′, Y )− (X,Y )| = ǫ.
Next we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.21. Let X and Y be random variables and let Y denote the range of Y . Assume that
X is ǫ-close to having min-entropy k. Then for any ǫ′ > 0
Pr
Y
[
(X|Y = y) is ǫ′-close to a source with min-entropy k − log |Y| − log
(
1
ǫ′
)]
≥ 1− ǫ′ − ǫ
ǫ′
.
Proof. Let X denote the range of X. Assume that X ′ is a distribution on X with min-entropy k
such that |X −X ′| ≤ ǫ. Then by lemma 3.20, there exists a joint distribution (X ′, Y ) such that
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|(X,Y )− (X ′, Y )| ≤ ǫ.
Now for any y ∈ Y, let ∆y =
∑
x∈X |Pr[X = x, Y = y]− Pr[X ′ = x, Y = y]|. Then we have∑
y∈Y
∆y ≤ ǫ.
For any y ∈ Y, the statistical distance between X|Y = y and X ′|Y = y is
δy =
∑
x∈X
|Pr[X = x|Y = y]− Pr[X ′ = x|Y = y]|
= (
∑
x∈X
|Pr[X = x, Y = y]− Pr[X ′ = x, Y = y]|)/(Pr[Y = y]) = ∆y/Pr[Y = y].
Thus if δy ≥ ǫ′ then ∆y ≥ ǫ′ Pr[Y = y]. Let BY = {y : δy ≥ ǫ′} then we have
ǫ′ Pr[y ∈ BY ] =
∑
y∈BY
ǫ′ Pr[Y = y] ≤
∑
y∈BY
∆y ≤
∑
y∈Y
∆y ≤ ǫ.
Thus Pr[y ∈ BY ] ≤ ǫǫ′ . Note that when y /∈ By we have |X|Y = y −X ′|Y = y| < ǫ′. Thus by
Lemma 3.19 we have the statement of the lemma.
4 Privacy Amplification with an Active Adversary
In this section we formally define the privacy amplification problem. We will follow [DLWZ11] and
define a privacy amplification protocol (PA, PB). The protocol is executed by two parties Alice and
Bob, who share a secret X ∈ {0, 1}n. An active, computationally unbounded adversary Eve might
have some partial information E about X satisfying H˜∞(X|E) > k. Since Eve is unbounded, we
can assume without loss of generality that she is deterministic.
We assume that Eve has full control of the communication channel between the two parties.
This means that Eve can arbitrarily insert, delete, reorder or modify messages sent by Alice and
Bob to each other. In particular, Eve’s strategy PE defines two correlated executions (PA, PE) and
(PE , PB) between Alice and Eve, and Eve and Bob, called “left execution” and “right execution”,
respectively. Alice and Bob are assumed to have fresh, private and independent random bits Y
and W , respectively. Y and W are not known to Eve. In the protocol we use ⊥ as a special
symbol to indicate rejection. At the end of the left execution (PA(X,Y ), PE(E)), Alice outputs a
key RA ∈ {0, 1}m ∪ {⊥}. Similarly, Bob outputs a key RB ∈ {0, 1}m ∪ {⊥} at the end of the right
execution (PE(E), PB(X,W )). We let E
′ denote the final view of Eve, which includes E and the
communication transcripts of both executions (PA(X,Y ), PE(E)) and (PE(E), PB(X,W ). We can
now define the security of (PA, PB).
Definition 4.1. An interactive protocol (PA, PB), executed by Alice and Bob on a communication
channel fully controlled by an active adversary Eve, is a (k,m, ǫ)-privacy amplification protocol if
it satisfies the following properties whenever H˜∞(X|E) ≥ k:
1. Correctness. If Eve is passive, then Pr[RA = RB ∧ RA 6=⊥ ∧ RB 6=⊥] = 1.
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2. Robustness. We start by defining the notion of pre-application robustness, which states that
even if Eve is active, Pr[RA 6= RB ∧ RA 6=⊥ ∧ RB 6=⊥] 6 ǫ.
The stronger notion of post-application robustness is defined similarly, except Eve is addition-
ally given the key RA the moment she completed the left execution (PA, PE), and the key
RB the moment she completed the right execution (PE , PB). For example, if Eve completed
the left execution before the right execution, she may try to use RA to force Bob to output
a different key RB 6∈ {RA,⊥}, and vice versa.
3. Extraction. Given a string r ∈ {0, 1}m∪{⊥}, let purify(r) be ⊥ if r =⊥, and otherwise replace
r 6=⊥ by a fresh m-bit random string Um: purify(r) ← Um. Letting E′ denote Eve’s view of
the protocol, we require that
∆((RA, E
′), (purify(RA), E′)) ≤ ǫ and ∆((RB , E′), (purify(RB), E′)) ≤ ǫ
Namely, whenever a party does not reject, its key looks like a fresh random string to Eve.
The quantity k − m is called the entropy loss and the quantity log(1/ǫ) is called the security
parameter of the protocol.
5 Alternating Extraction Protocol and Look Ahead Extractor
An important ingredient in our construction is the following alternating extraction protocol modified
from that in [DW09].
Quentin: Q,S0 Wendy: X
S0
S0−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R0←−−−−−−−−−−−−− R0 = Raz(S0, X)
S1 = Extq(Q,R0)
S1−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R1←−−−−−−−−−−−−− R1 = Extw(X,S1)
S2 = Extq(Q,R1)
S2−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R2←−−−−−−−−−−−−− R2 = Extw(X,S2)
· · ·
St = Extq(Q,Rt−1)
St−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Rt = Extw(X,St)
Figure 1: Alternating Extraction.
Alternating Extraction. Assume that we have two parties, Quentin and Wendy. Quentin has
a source Q, Wendy has a source X. Also assume that Quentin has a weak source S0 with entropy
rate > 1/2 (which may be correlated with Q). Suppose that (Q,S0) is kept secret from Wendy and
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X is kept secret from Quentin. Let Extq, Extw be strong seeded extractors with optimal parameters,
such as that in Theorem 3.16. Let Raz be the strong two-source extractor in Theorem 3.17. Let
d be an integer parameter for the protocol. For some integer parameter t > 0, the alternating
extraction protocol is an interactive process between Quentin and Wendy that runs in t+ 1 steps.
In the 0’th step, Quentin sends S0 to Wendy, Wendy computes R0 = Raz(S0,X) and replies R0
to Quentin, Quentin then computes S1 = Extq(Q,R0). In this step R0, S1 each outputs d bits. In
the first step, Quentin sends S1 to Wendy, Wendy computes R1 = Extw(X,S1). She sends R1 to
Quentin and Quentin computes S2 = Extq(Q,R1). In this step R1, S2 each outputs d bits. In each
subsequent step i, Quentin sends Si to Wendy, Wendy computes Ri = Extw(X,Si). She replies
Ri to Quentin and Quentin computes Si+1 = Extq(Q,Ri). In step i, Ri, Si+1 each outputs d bits.
Therefore, this process produces the following sequence:
S0, R0 = Raz(S0,X),S1 = Extq(Q,R0), R1 = Extw(X,S1), · · · ,
St = Extq(Q,Rt−1), Rt = Extw(X,St).
Look-Ahead Extractor. Now we can define our look-ahead extractor. Let Y = (Q,S0) be a
seed, the look-ahead extractor is defined as
laExt(X,Y ) = laExt(X, (Q,S0))
def
= R1, · · · , Rt.
Note that the look-ahead extractor can be computed by each party (Alice or Bob) alone in our
final protocol. We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. In the alternating extraction protocol, assume that X has n bits and Q has at most
n bits. Let ǫ > 0 be a parameter and d = O(log n+ log(1/ǫ)) > log(1/ǫ) be the number of random
bits needed in Theorem 3.16 to achieve error ǫ. Assume that X has min-entropy at least 12d2, Q
has min-entropy at least 11d2 and S0 is a (40d, 38d) source. Let Extw and Extq be strong extractors
in Theorem 3.16 that use d bits to extract d bits. Let t = 4d.
Let (Q′, S′0) be another distribution on the same support of (Q,S0) such that (Q,S0, Q
′, S′0)
is independent of X. Now run the alternating extraction protocol with X and (Q′, S′0) where in
each step we obtain S′i, R
′
i. For any i, 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1, let S¯i = (S0, · · · , Si), S¯′i = (S′0, · · · , S′i),
R¯i = (R0, · · · , Ri) and R¯′i = (R′0, · · · , R′i). Then for any i, 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, we have
(Ri, ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R
′
i−1, Si, S
′
i, Q,Q
′) ≈(2i+2)ǫ (Ud, ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1, Si, S′i, Q,Q′).
Proof. We first prove the following claim.
Claim 5.2. In step 0, we have
(R0, S0, S
′
0, Q,Q
′) ≈ǫ (Ud, S0, S′0, Q,Q′)
and
(S1, R0, S0, R
′
0, S
′
0) ≈3ǫ (Ud, R0, S0, R′0, S′0).
Moreover, conditioned on (S0, S
′
0), (R0, R
′
0) are both deterministic functions of X; conditioned on
(R0, S0, R
′
0, S
′
0), (S1, S
′
1) are deterministic functions of (Q,Q
′).
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Proof of the claim. Note that S0 is a (40d, 38d) source. Thus by Theorem 3.17 we have that
(R0, S0) ≈ǫ (Ud, S0).
Since conditioned on S0, R0 is a deterministic function of X, which is independent of (Q,Q
′),
we also have that
(R0, S0, S
′
0, Q,Q
′) ≈ǫ (Ud, S0, S′0, Q,Q′).
Now we fix (S0, S
′
0) and (R0, R
′
0) are both deterministic functions of X. Since the size of (S0, S
′
0)
is at most 80d, by Lemma 3.19 we have that with probability 1− ǫ over these fixings, Q is a source
with entropy 10d2. Since R0, R
′
0 are both deterministic functions of X, they are independent of Q.
Therefore by Theorem 3.16 we have
(S1, R0, R
′
0) ≈ǫ (Ud, R0, R′0).
Thus altogether we have that
(S1, R0, S0, R
′
0, S
′
0) ≈3ǫ (Ud, R0, S0, R′0, S′0)
Moreover, conditioned on (R0, S0, R
′
0, S
′
0), (S1, S
′
1) are deterministic functions of (Q,Q
′).
Now we fix (R0, S0, R
′
0, S
′
0). Note that after this fixing, S1, S
′
1 are are deterministic functions of
(Q,Q′). Note that with probability 1− ǫ over this fixing, Q has min-entropy at least 10d2.
We now prove the lemma. In fact, we prove the following stronger claim.
Claim 5.3. For any i, we have that
(Ri, ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R
′
i−1, Si, S
′
i, Q,Q
′) ≈(2i+2)ǫ (Ud, ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1, Si, S′i, Q,Q′)
and
(Si+1, S¯i, S¯′i, R¯i, R¯
′
i) ≈(2i+3)ǫ (Ud, S¯i, S¯′i, R¯i, R¯′i).
Moreover, conditioned on ( ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R
′
i−1, Si, S
′
i), (Ri, R
′
i) are both deterministic functions
of X; conditioned on (S¯i, S¯′i, R¯i, R¯
′
i), (Si+1, S
′
i+1) are deterministic functions of (Q,Q
′).
We prove the claim by induction on i. When i = 0, the statements are already proved in
Claim 5.2. Now we assume that the statements hold for i = j and we prove them for i = j + 1.
We first fix (S¯j, S¯′j , R¯j , R¯
′
j). Since now (Sj+1, S
′
j+1) are deterministic functions of (Q,Q
′), they
are independent ofX. Moreover Sj+1 is (2j+3)ǫ-close to uniform. Note that the average conditional
min-entropy of X is at least 12d2 − 2d · 4d ≥ 4d2. Therefore by Theorem 3.16 we have that
(Rj+1, S¯j , S¯′j , R¯j , R¯
′
j , Sj+1, S
′
j+1) ≈(2j+4)ǫ (Ud, S¯j , S¯′j, R¯j , R¯′j , Sj+1, S′j+1).
Since (Sj+1, S
′
j+1) are deterministic functions of (Q,Q
′), we also have
(Rj+1, S¯j, S¯
′
j , R¯j , R¯
′
j , Sj+1, S
′
j+1, Q,Q
′) ≈(2j+4)ǫ (Ud, S¯j , S¯′j, R¯j , R¯′j , Sj+1, S′j+1, Q,Q′).
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Moreover, conditioned on (S¯j , S¯′j , R¯j, R¯
′
j , Sj+1, S
′
j+1), (Rj+1, R
′
j+1) are both deterministic func-
tions of X.
Next, since conditioned on (S¯j , S¯′j , R¯j , R¯
′
j , Sj+1, S
′
j+1), (Rj+1, R
′
j+1) are both deterministic func-
tions of X, they are independent of (Q,Q′). Moreover Rj+1 is (2j+4)ǫ-close to uniform. Note that
the average conditional min-entropy of Q is at least 10d2 − 8d2 = 2d2. Therefore by Theorem 3.16
we have that
(Sj+2, S¯j, S¯′j , R¯j , R¯
′
j , Sj+1, S
′
j+1, Rj+1, R
′
j+1)
≈(2j+5)ǫ(Ud, S¯j, S¯′j , R¯j , R¯′j , Sj+1, S′j+1, Rj+1, R′j+1).
Namely,
(Sj+2, Sj+1, S′j+1, Rj+1, R
′
j+1) ≈(2(j+1)+3)ǫ (Ud, Sj+1, S′j+1, Rj+1, R′j+1).
Moreover, conditioned on (Sj+1, S
′
j+1, Rj+1, R
′
j+1), (Sj+2, S
′
j+2) are deterministic functions of (Q,Q
′).
6 Non-Malleable Condensers for Arbitrary Min-Entropy
In this section we give our construction of non-malleable condensers for arbitrary min-entropy.
First, we need the following definitions and constructions from [DW09].
Definition 6.1. [DW09] Given S1, S2 ⊆ {1, · · · , t}, we say that the ordered pair (S1, S2) is top-
heavy if there is some integer j such that |S≥j1 | > |S≥j2 |, where S≥j
def
= {s ∈ S|s ≥ j}. Note that it
is possible that (S1, S2) and (S2, S1) are both top-heavy. For a collection Ψ of sets Si ⊆ {1, · · · , t},
we say that Ψ is pairwise top-heavy if every ordered pair (Si, Sj) of sets Si, Sj ∈ Ψ with i 6= j, is
top-heavy.
Now, for any m-bit message µ = (b1, · · · , bm), consider the following mapping of µ to a subset
S ⊆ {1, · · · , 4m}:
f(µ) = f(b1, · · · , bm) = {4i − 3 + bi, 4i − bi|i = 1, · · · ,m}
i.e., each bit bi decides if to include {4i− 3, 4i} (if bi = 0) or {4i− 2, 4i − 1} (if bi = 1) in S.
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2. [DW09] The above construction gives a pairwise top-heavy collection Ψ of 2m sets
S ⊆ {1, · · · , t} where t = 4m. Furthermore, the function f is an efficient mapping of µ ∈ {0, 1}m
to Sµ.
Now we have the following construction.
Let r ∈ ({0, 1}d)t be the output of the look-ahead extractor defined above, i.e., r = (r1, · · · , rt) =
laExt(X, (Q,S0)). Let Ψ = {S1, · · · , S2m} be the pairwise top-heavy collection of sets constructed
above. For any message µ ∈ {0, 1}m, define the function laMACr(µ) def= [ri|i ∈ Sµ], indexed by r.
Now we can describe our construction of the non-malleable condenser.
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Algorithm 6.3 (nmCond(x, y)).
Input: ℓ–an integer parameter. x — a sample from an (n, k)-source with k ≥ 60d2. y–an
independent random seed with y = (y1, y2) such that y1 has size d = O(log n + ℓ) > 5ℓ and y2
has size 12d2.
Output: z — an m bit string.
Sub-Routines and Parameters:
Let nmExt be the non-malleable extractor from Theorem 3.18, with error 2−4ℓ.
Let Ext be the strong extractor with optimal parameters from Theorem 3.16, with error 2−5ℓ.
Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor defined above, using Ext as Extq and Exts. laExt is set up
to extract from x using seed (q, s0) such that q = y2 and s0 is the string that contains the first
40d bits of y2, and output a string r ∈ ({0, 1}d)t with t = 4d.
Let laMACr(µ) be the function defined above.
1. Compute w = Ext(x, y1) with output size 20d
2 and r = laExt(x, (q, s0)).
2. Output z = (nmExt(w, y2), laMACr(y1)) such that nmExt(w, y2) has size 8d
2.
We can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4. There exists a constant C > 0 such that given any s > 0, as long as k ≥ C(log n+
s)2, the above construction is a (k, s, 2−s)-non-malleable condenser with seed length O(log n + s)2
and output length O(log n+ s)2.
Proof. Let A be any (deterministic) function such that ∀y ∈ Supp(Y ),A(y) 6= y. We will show that
for most y, with high probability over the fixing of nmCond(X,A(y)), nmCond(X, y) is still close
to having min-entropy at least ℓ. Let Y ′ = A(Y ). Thus Y ′ 6= Y . In the following analysis we will
use letters with prime to denote the corresponding random variables produced with Y ′ instead of
Y . Let V1 = nmExt(W,Y2) and V2 = laMACR(Y1). Thus Z = (V1, V2). We have the following two
cases.
Case 1: Y1 = Y
′
1 . In this case, since Y
′ 6= Y , we must have that Y2 6= Y ′2 . Now by Theorem 3.16
we have that
(W,Y1) ≈2−5ℓ (U, Y1).
Therefore, we can now fix Y1 (and thus Y
′
1), and with probability 1 − 2−ℓ over this fixing, W
is 2−4ℓ-close to uniform. Moreover, after this fixing W is a deterministic function of X and thus is
independent of Y2. Note also that after this fixing, Y
′
2 is a deterministic function of Y2. Thus by
Theorem 3.18 we have that
(V1, V
′
1 , Y2, Y
′
2) ≈O(2−4ℓ) (U8d2 , V ′1 , Y2, Y ′2).
Therefore, we can now further fix Y2 (and thus Y
′
2) and with probability at least 1−O(2−ℓ) over
this fixing, (V1, V
′
1) is 2
−3ℓ-close to (U8d2 , V ′1). Thus we can further fix V
′
1 , and with probability at
least 1− 2−ℓ over this fixing, V1 is 2−2ℓ-close to uniform. Now note that V1 has size 8d2 and V ′2 has
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size 2d2. Thus by Lemma 3.21, we can further fix V ′2 , and with probability at least 1− 2 · 2−ℓ over
this fixing, V1 is 2
ℓ-close to having min-entropy at least 8d2 − 2d2 − ℓ ≥ 5d2.
Thus in this case we have shown that, with probability 1 − O(2−ℓ) over the fixing of Y , with
probability 1−O(2−ℓ) over the fixing of Z ′, Z is 2−ℓ-close to having min-entropy at least 5d2 > 5ℓ2.
Case 2: Y1 6= Y ′1 . In this case, we first fix Y1 and Y ′1 . Note that after this fixing, W and W ′
are now deterministic functions of X. We now further fix W and W ′ and after this fixing, X and
Y2 are still independent. Since the total size of (W,W
′) is 40d2, by Lemma 3.19 we have that with
probability 1− 2−2ℓ over this fixing, X still has min-entropy at least 60d2− 40d2− 2ℓ > 12d2. Note
also that after this fixing, Y ′2 is a deterministic function of Y2. However, since Y
′
1 may be a function
of Y2, fixing Y
′
1 may cause Y2 to lose entropy. Note that Y
′
1 only has size d, thus by Lemma 3.19,
with probability 1 − 2 · 2−2ℓ over the fixing of (Y1, Y ′1), we have that Y2 has min-entropy at least
12d2 − d− 2ℓ > 11d2 and S0 has min-entropy at least 40d− d− 2ℓ > 38d.
Now assume that X has min-entropy at least 12d2, Y2 has min-entropy at least 11d
2 and
S0 has min-entropy at least 38d. This happens with probability at least 1 − O(2−ℓ). For any
i, 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, let S¯i = (S0, · · · , Si), S¯′i = (S′0, · · · , S′i), R¯i = (R0, · · · , Ri) and R¯′i = (R′0, · · · , R′i).
Now by Lemma 5.1 (note that Y2 = (Q,S0)) we have that for any i, 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1,
(Ri, ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R
′
i−1, Si, S
′
i, Y2) ≈(2i+2)2−5ℓ (Ud, ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1, Si, S′i, Y2).
Therefore, we have that for any i,
(Ri, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1, Y2) ≈(2i+2)2−5ℓ (Ud, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1, Y2).
Thus, for any i, with probability 1− 2−1.25ℓ over the fixing of Y2, we have
(Ri, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1) ≈(2i+2)2−3.75ℓ (Ud, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1).
By the union bound, we have that with probability 1− t2−1.25ℓ over the fixing of Y2, for any i,
(Ri, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1) ≈(2i+2)2−3.75ℓ (Ud, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1).
Consider a typical fixing of Y2. Now note that V2 = laMACR(Y1) and V
′
2 = laMACR′(Y
′
1). Let
the two sets in Lemma 6.2 that correspond to Y1 and Y
′
1 be H and H
′. Since Y1 6= Y ′1 , by definition
there exists j ∈ [4d] such that |H≥j | > |H ′≥j |. Let l = |H≥j|. Thus l ≤ t and |H ′≥j| ≤ l − 1. Let
RH be the concatenation of {Ri, i ∈ H≥j} and R′H′ be the concatenation of {R′i, i ∈ H ′≥j}.
By the above equation and the hybrid argument we have that
(RH , ¯Rj−1, ¯R′j−1) ≈3t2·2−3.75ℓ (Uld, ¯Rj−1, ¯R′j−1).
Thus now we can first fix ¯R′j−1, and with probability 1− 2−1.25ℓ over this fixing, we have
RH ≈3t2·2−2.5ℓ Uld.
We now fix R′H′ . Since |H ′≥j | ≤ l− 1, the size of R′H′ is at most (l− 1)d. Thus by Lemma 3.21
we have that with probability at least 1− (3t2 + 1) · 2−1.25ℓ over this fixing, RH is 2−1.25ℓ-close to
having min-entropy d − 1.25ℓ > ℓ. Note that after we fix ¯R′j−1 and R′H′ , we have also fixed V ′2 .
Since W ′ and Y ′2 are already fixed, V
′
1 is also fixed. Thus Z
′ is fixed. Therefore altogether we have
that with probability 1 − 2 · 2−2ℓ − t2−1.25ℓ = 1 − O(2−ℓ) over the fixings of Y , with probability
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1 − 2−1.25ℓ − (3t2 + 1) · 2−1.25ℓ = 1 − O(2−ℓ) over the fixings of Z ′, Z is 2−1.25ℓ-close to having
min-entropy ℓ.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2, and notice that the fraction of “bad seeds” that an adversary
can achieve is at most the sum of the fraction of bad seeds in both cases. Thus by choosing an
appropriate ℓ = O(s) we have that the construction is a (k, s, 2−s)-non-malleable condenser with
seed length O(log n+ s)2.
The following theorem is proved in [Li12a].
Theorem 6.5. [Li12a] There exists a constant C > 1 such that the following holds. For any
integers n, k and ǫ > 0, assume that there is an explicit (k, k′, ǫ)-non-malleable condenser with
seed length d such that k′ ≥ C(log n + log(1/ǫ)). Then there exists an explicit 2-round privacy
amplification protocol for (n, k) sources with entropy loss O(log n + log(1/ǫ)) and communication
complexity O(d+ log n+ log(1/ǫ)).
Combining the above theorem and theorem 6.4, we immediately get a 2-round privacy amplifi-
cation protocol with optimal entropy loss for any (n, k) source.
Theorem 6.6. There exists a constant C such that for any ǫ > 0 with k ≥ C(log n + log(1/ǫ))2,
there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol for (n, k) sources with security param-
eter log(1/ǫ), entropy loss O(log n+ log(1/ǫ)) and communication complexity O(log n+ log(1/ǫ))2.
In fact, we have a slightly simpler protocol that uses the look-ahead extractor and MAC some-
what more directly, while achieving the same performance.
We assume that the shared weak random source has min-entropy k, and the error ǫ we seek
satisfies ǫ < 1/n and k > C(log n + log(1/ǫ))2 for some constant C > 1. For convenience, in
the description below we introduce an “auxiliary” security parameter s. Eventually, we will set
s = log(C ′/ǫ) + O(1) = log(1/ǫ) + O(1), so that C ′/2s < ǫ, for a sufficiently large constant C ′
related to the number of “bad” events we need to account for. We need the following building
blocks:
• Let Ext be a (k, 2−5s)-extractor with optimal entropy loss and seed length d = O(log n+ s) >
202s, from Theorem 3.16. Assume that k ≥ 15d2.
• Let Raz be the two source extractor from Theorem 3.17.
• Let MAC be the (“leakage-resilient”) MAC, as in Theorem 3.12, with tag length v = 2s and
key length ℓ = 2v = 4s.
• Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor defined above, using Ext as Extq and Exts. laExt is set
up to extract from x using seed (q, s0) such that q = y2 and s0 is the string that contains the
first 40d bits of y2, and output a string r ∈ ({0, 1}d)t with t = 4d.
• Let laMACr(µ) be the function defined above.
• In the protocol Alice will sample three random strings Y1, Y2, Y3, with size d, 12d2 and 50d2
respectively.
Using the above building blocks, the protocol is given in Figure 2. To emphasize the adversary
Eve, we use letters with ‘prime’ to denote all the variables seen or generated by Bob; e.g., Bob
picks W ′, but Alice may see a different W , etc.
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Alice: X Eve: E Bob: X
Sample random Y = (Y1, Y2, Y3).
Compute R2 = laExt(X,Y2).
Z = laMACR2(Y1).
R1 = Ext(X,Y1) and output 4s bits.
(Y1, Y2, Y3) −−−−−−−−→ (Y ′1 , Y ′2 , Y ′3)
Sample random W ′ with d bits.
Compute R′
2
= laExt(X,Y ′
2
).
Z ′ = laMACR′
2
(Y ′
1
).
R′
1
= Ext(X,Y ′
1
) and output 4s bits.
T ′
1
= Raz(Y ′
3
, Z ′) with s bits,
T ′
2
= MACR′
1
(W ′).
Set final RB = Ext(X,W
′).
(W,T1, T2)←−−−−−−−− (W ′, T ′1, T ′2)
If T1 6= Raz(Y3, Z) or
T2 6= MACR1(W ) reject.
Set final RA = Ext(X,W ).
Figure 2: 2-round Privacy Amplification Protocol.
Theorem 6.7. Assume that k > C(log n+log(1/ǫ))2 for some constant C > 1. The above protocol
is a privacy amplification protocol with security parameter log(1/ǫ), entropy loss O(log(1/ǫ)) and
communication complexity O(log(1/ǫ)2).
Proof. The proof can be divided into two cases: whether the adversary changes Y1 or not.
Case 1: The adversary does not change Y1. In this case, note that R1 = R
′
1 and is 2
−5s-close to
uniform in Eve’s view (even conditioned on Y1, Y2, Y3). Thus the property of the MAC guarantees
that Bob can authenticate W ′ to Alice. However, one thing to note here is that Eve has some
additional information, namely T ′1 which can leak information about the MAC key. On the other
hand, the size of T ′1 is s, thus by Lemma 3.9 the average conditional min-entropy H∞(R1|T ′1) is
at least 3s. Therefore by Theorem 3.12 the probability that Eve can change W ′ to a different W
without causing Alice to reject is at most⌈
d1
2s
⌉
22s−H˜∞(R1|T
′
1
) + 2−5s ≤ O(22s−3s) + 2−5s ≤ O(2−s).
When W =W ′, by Theorem 3.16 RA = RB and is 2−5s-close to uniform in Eve’s view.
Case 2: The adversary does change Y1. Thus we have Y1 6= Y ′1 . Here the proof is similar to the
proof of the non-malleable condenser. We first fix Y1 and Y
′
1 . Note that after this fixing, R1 and R
′
1
are now deterministic functions of X. We now further fix R1 and R
′
1 and after this fixing, X and
(Y2, Y3) are still independent. Since the total size of (R1, R
′
1) is 8s, by Lemma 3.19 we have that
with probability 1 − 2−2s over this fixing, X still has min-entropy at least 15d2 − 8s − 2s > 12d2.
Note also that after this fixing, Y ′2 is a deterministic function of (Y2, Y3). However, since Y
′
1 may
be a function of Y2, fixing Y
′
1 may cause Y2 to lose entropy. Note that Y
′
1 only has size d, thus by
Lemma 3.19, with probability 1−2·2−2s over the fixing of (Y1, Y ′1), we have that Y2 has min-entropy
at least 12d2 − d− 2s > 11d2 and S0 has min-entropy at least 40d − d− 2s > 38d.
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Now assume that X has min-entropy at least 12d2, Y2 has min-entropy at least 11d
2 and
S0 has min-entropy at least 38d. This happens with probability at least 1 − O(2−s). For any
i, 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, let S¯i = (S0, · · · , Si), S¯′i = (S′0, · · · , S′i), R¯i = (R0, · · · , Ri) and R¯′i = (R′0, · · · , R′i).
Again by Lemma 5.1 we have that for any i,
(Ri, ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R
′
i−1, Si, S
′
i, Y2, Y
′
2) ≈(2i+2)2−5s (Ud, ¯Si−1, ¯S′i−1, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1, Si, S′i, Y2, Y ′2).
Thus for any i, we have
(Ri, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1, Y2, Y
′
2) ≈(2i+2)2−5s (Ud, ¯Ri−1, ¯R′i−1, Y2, Y ′2).
Now by the same analysis as in the proof of the non-malleable condenser (and recall that Y1 6=
Y ′1), we have that with probability 1− t2−1.25ℓ over the fixing of (Y2, Y ′2), with probability at least
1− (3t2+1) ·2−1.25s over the fixing of Z ′, Z is 2−1.25s-close to having min-entropy d−1.25s > 200s.
Note that we have now fixed (Y1, Y
′
1 , Y2, Y
′
2) and (R1, R
′
1, Z
′). After all these fixings, Z is a
deterministic function of X and is 2−1.25s-close to having min-entropy 200s. Thus Z is independent
of Y3 (note that Z
′ is also a deterministic function of X, thus fixing Z ′ does not influence the
independence of Z and Y3). Note that after these fixings, Y
′
3 is a deterministic function of Y3, and
since the size of (Y ′1 , Y
′
2) is d+ 12d
2 < 13d2, by Lemma 3.19 Y3 is 2
−s-close to having min-entropy
50d2 − 13d2 − s > 36d2. Thus by Theorem 3.17 we have
(Raz(Y3, Z), Y3, Y
′
3) ≈O(2−s) (Us, Y3, Y ′3).
Since we already fixed (Y1, Y
′
1 , Y2, Y
′
2) and (R1, R
′
1, Z
′), and W ′ is independent of all random
variables above, this also implies that
(Raz(Y3, Z), R
′
1, Z
′, Y, Y ′,W ′) ≈O(2−s) (Us, R′1, Z ′, Y, Y ′,W ′).
Note that T ′1 = Raz(Y
′
3 , Z
′) and T ′2 = MACR′1(W
′). Thus we have
(Raz(Y3, Z), T
′
1, T
′
2, Y, Y
′,W ′) ≈O(2−s) (Us, T ′1, T ′2, Y, Y ′,W ′).
Therefore, the probability that the adversary can guess the correct T1 is at most 2
−s+O(2−s) =
O(2−s). For an appropriately chosen s = log(1/ǫ) + O(1) this is at most ǫ. Note that conditioned
on the fixing of Y , the random variables that are used to authenticate W ′ are (R1, T1), which are
deterministic functions of X and have size O(s), thus the entropy loss of the protocol is O(log(1/ǫ)).
The communication complexity can be easily verified to be O(log(1/ǫ)2).
7 Improved Privacy Amplification Protocol for Smaller Error
The 2-round protocol described above only works for security parameter up to Ω(
√
k). In this
section we generalize the above protocol and give a protocol that can achieve security parameter
up to Ω(k), or equivalently, error as small as 2−Ω(k). First we need the following definition and
theorem.
Definition 7.1. For any two strings c and c′ of length λc, let EditDis(c, c′) denote the edit distance
between c and c′, i.e., the minimum number of single-bit insert, delete or alter operations required
to change string c into c′.
22
Definition 7.2. [CKOR10] Let m ∈ {0, 1}λm . For some constant 0 < e < 1, a function Edit :
{0, 1}λm → {0, 1}λc is a (λm, e, ρ)- code for edit errors, if ρλc = λm and the following properties
are satisfied:
• c = Edit(m) can be computed in polynomial (in λm) time, given m, for all m ∈ {0, 1}λm .
• For any m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}λm with m 6= m′, EditDis(c, c′) ≥ eλc, where c = Edit(m) and c′ =
Edit(m′).
ρ = λmλc is called the rate of the code.
As in [CKOR10] the code we use is due to Schulman and Zuckerman [SZ99]:
Theorem 7.3 ([SZ99, CKOR10]). Let 0 < e < 1 be a constant. Then for some constant 0 < ρ < 1
there exists a (λm, e, ρ)-code for edit errors.
We assume that the shared weak random source has min-entropy k ≥ log4 n, and the error ǫ
we seek satisfies 2−βk < ǫ < 2−Ω(
√
k) for some constant β < 1. Again, in the description below we
will introduce an “auxiliary” security parameter s with s = C ′(log(1/ǫ)) for some sufficiently large
constant C ′. We will also use another parameter ℓ = α
√
k for some constant 0 < α < 1 such that
k > C(log n+ ℓ)2 for some constant C > 1. We need the following building blocks:
• Let Ext1 be a (k, 2−s)-extractor with optimal entropy loss and seed length d1 = O(log n+s) =
O(s) > 2s, from Theorem 3.16.
• Let Ext2 be a (k, 2−10ℓ)-extractor with seed length d2 = O(log n + ℓ) = O(ℓ) > 404ℓ and
output length d2, from Theorem 3.16. Assume that k ≥ d1/ρ+ 2s+ 15d22.
• Let Raz be the two source extractor from Theorem 3.17.
• Let MAC be the (“leakage-resilient”) MAC, as in Theorem 3.12, with tag length v = 2d1/ρ
and key length 2v = 4d1/ρ.
• Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor defined above, using Ext2 as Extq and Exts. laExt is set
up to extract from x using seed (q, s0) such that q = y2 and s0 is the string that contains the
first 40d2 bits of y2, and output a string r ∈ ({0, 1}d2)t with t = 4d2.
• Let laMACr(µ) be the function defined above.
• In each phase of the protocol Alice will sample two random strings Yi2, Yi3, with size 12d22
and 50d22 respectively.
Given these building blocks, our protocol runs in roughly L = d1/(ρd2) phases. The protocol is
given in Figure 3.
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.4. The probability that Eve can successfully change Y into Y ′ 6= Y without causing
either Alice or Bob to reject is at most 2−Ω(s).
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Alice: X Eve: E Bob: X
Sample random Y with d1 bits. Phase 1
Let M = Edit(Y ). M has length d1/ρ.
Divide M sequentially into L blocks
M =M1 ◦ · · · ◦ML
with each block having d2 bits.
Sample random (Y12, Y13).
Compute R1 = laExt(X,Y12).
Z1 = laMACR1(M1).
(Y,M1, Y12, Y13) −−→ (Y ′,M ′1, Y ′12, Y ′13)
Sample random W ′
1
with d2 bits.
Compute R′
1
= laExt(X,Y ′
12
).
Z ′
1
= laMACR′
1
(M ′
1
).
T ′
1
= Raz(Y ′
13
, Z ′
1
) with 2ℓ bits.
(W1, T1)←−− (W ′1, T ′1)
If T1 6= Raz(Y13, Z1) reject.
Phases 2..L
For i = 2 to L For i = 2 to L
Sample random (Yi2, Yi3).
Vi−1 = Ext2(X,Wi−1) with 2ℓ bits.
Ri = laExt(X,Yi2).
Zi = laMACRi(Mi).
(Vi−1,Mi, Yi2, Yi3) −−→ (V ′i−1,M ′i , Y ′i2, Y ′i3)
If V ′i−1 6= Ext2(X,W ′i−1) reject.
Sample random W ′i with d2 bits.
R′i = laExt(X,Y
′
i2).
Z ′i = laMACR′i(M
′
i).
T ′i = Raz(Y
′
i3, Z
′
i) with 2ℓ bits.
(Wi, Ti)←−− (W ′i , T ′i )
If Ti 6= Raz(Yi3, Zi) reject.
EndFor EndFor
Phase L+ 1
M ′ =M ′
1
◦ · · · ◦M ′L.
If M ′ 6= Edit(Y ′) reject.
R = Ext1(X,Y ) with 4d1/ρ bits. R
′ = Ext1(X,Y
′) with 4d1/ρ bits.
VL = Ext2(X,WL) with 2ℓ bits.
(VL) −−→ (V ′L)
If V ′L 6= Ext2(X,W ′L) reject.
Sample random W ′ with d1 bits.
T ′ = MACR′(W
′).
Set final RB = Ext1(X,W
′).
(W,T )←−− (W ′, T ′)
If T 6= MACR(W ) reject.
Set final RA = Ext1(X,W ).
Figure 3: (2L+ 2)-round Privacy Amplification Protocol for H˜∞(X|E) ≥ k.
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Proof. We analyze the transcript of the protocol in Eve’s view. Normally, Eve should do alternate
interactions with Alice and Bob to send the encoded string M . However, since Eve is adversarial,
she may do several interactions with Alice or Bob before she resumes interaction with the other. If
Eve interacts with Alice twice before she interacts with Bob, then this can be viewed as deleting
the first block of message that Alice sends. We call this operation “D”. If Eve interacts with Bob
twice before she interacts with Alice, then this can be viewed as inserting a block of message to
Bob. We call this operation “I”. If Eve does not do the above two operations but changes some
Mi into a different string M
′
i and sends it to Bob, then this can be viewed as altering this block of
message. We call this operation “A”.
Now if Eve successfully changes Y into Y ′ 6= Y without causing either Alice or Bob to reject,
then she must also successfully changes M = Edit(Y ) to M ′ = Edit(Y ′) without causing either
Alice or Bob to reject, by a series of (D, I,A) operations. During these operations, we say that at
some point Eve has to answer a challenge if Eve has to correctly guess the value of a string that is
(close to) uniform even conditioned on the fixing of all transcripts up to this time. We now have
the following lemma.
Lemma 7.5. For all (D, I,A) operations, except A operations that are immediately followed by I
operations, Eve has to answer a challenge.
Proof of the lemma. We shall be imprecise about the numbers here. The exact numbers will appear
in our next lemma. Note that in the whole protocol the total size of the messages that contain
information about X (the (V, V ′)s and (T, T ′)s) is at most L(8ℓ) = d1/(ρd2) · (8ℓ) < d1/ρ and
k > d1/ρ+ 2s+ 15d
2
2. Thus at any time even if conditioned on the fixing of the transcript, X still
has a lot of entropy.
Now if Eve performs a D operation after Alice sends out (Vi−1,Mi, Yi2, Yi3), then by definition
Eve is going to interact with Alice again without interacting with Bob. However Alice is not going
to do anything until she receives a response Ti from Bob and checks that Ti = Raz(Yi3, Zi). By
the same analysis in Theorem 6.7, even if conditioned on the transcript, Raz(Yi3, Zi) is close to
uniform. Thus Eve has to answer a challenge.
If Eve performs an I operation after Bob sends out (W ′i , T
′
i ), then by definition Eve is going to
interact with Bob again without interacting with Alice. However Bob is not going to do anything
until he receives a response V ′i from Alice and checks that V
′
i = Ext2(X,W
′
i ). Since conditioned on
the transcript X has a lot of entropy and W ′i is uniform and independent of the transcript and X,
we have that Ext2(X,W
′
i ) is close to uniform. Thus Eve has to answer a challenge.
If Eve performs an A operation that is not followed by an I operation, then by definition
Eve alters an message Mi to M
′
i , sends it to Bob and next she is going to interact with Alice
(otherwise Eve is going to perform an I operation). Conditioned on the fixing of the transcript
before Alice sends out (Vi−1,Mi, Yi2, Yi3), this is exactly the 2-round protocol as in Theorem 6.7.
Since conditioned on the transcript X has a lot of entropy and Mi 6= M ′i , by the same analysis in
Theorem 6.7, even if further conditioned on the transcript of these two rounds, Raz(Yi3, Zi) is close
to uniform. Thus Eve has to answer a challenge.
We note that if Eve performs an A operation followed by an I operation, then the above
argument may not work (Eve may not have to answer a challenge for the A operation), because the
subsequent messages sent out by Bob induced by the I operation may give additional information
about Raz(Yi3, Zi).
Our next lemma bounds the probability that Eve successfully answers a challenge.
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Lemma 7.6. For any i ∈ N, let Hi stand for the event that Eve successfully answers the i’th
challenge and Ei = ∩ij=1Hj stand for the event that Eve successfully answers all the challenges up
to the i’th challenge. Then if Pr[Ei] > 2
−s, we have
Pr[Hi+1|Ei] < 2−ℓ.
Proof of the lemma. Note that in the whole protocol the total size of the messages that contain
information about X (the V s and T s) is at most L(8ℓ) = d1/(ρd2) ·(8ℓ) < d1/ρ and k > d1/ρ+2s+
15d22. Thus by Lemma 3.19, at any time, with probability 1 − 2−2s over the fixing of the previous
transcript, X has min-entropy at least k − d1/ρ− 2s > 15d22.
Now we fix the transcript up to the time before Eve answers the i + 1’th challenge. The
transcript thus determines if Eve successfully answers all previous i challenges. Now consider the
transcripts that are in Ei. If Pr[Ei] > 2
−s, we have that conditioned on Ei, with probability at
least 1− 2−2s/Pr[Ei] > 1− 2−s over the fixing of the transcript, X has min-entropy at least 15d22.
Now assume X indeed has min-entropy at least 15d22. If for the i+1’th challenge, Eve performs
a D operation or an A operation not followed by an I operation, then by the same analysis in
Theorem 6.7, Pr[Hi+1] ≤ O(2−2ℓ). If Eve performs an I operation, then by Theorem 3.16, we have
(Ext2(X,W
′
i ),W
′
i ) ≈2−10ℓ (U2ℓ,W ′i ). Thus we have Pr[Hi+1] ≤ 2−2ℓ + 2−10ℓ = O(2−2ℓ). Adding
back the error 2−s, we have
Pr[Hi+1|Ei] ≤ O(2−2ℓ) + 2−s < 2−ℓ.
Our last lemma bounds the number of challenges that Eve has to answer.
Lemma 7.7. If Eve successfully changes Y into Y ′ 6= Y without causing either Alice or Bob to re-
ject, then she successfully answers at least 2eL/3 challenges, where e is the constant in Theorem 7.3.
Proof of the lemma. If Eve successfully changes Y into Y ′ 6= Y , then she also successfully changes
M = Edit(Y ) to M ′ = Edit(Y ′). Let a be the number of D operations Eve performs, b be the
number of I operations Eve performs and c be the number of A operations Eve performs. Since an
operation on a block with size d2 is at most d2 operations on the bits, by the property of the edit
distance code, we have
(a+ b+ c)d2 ≥ ed2L.
Thus
(a+ b+ c) ≥ eL.
By Lemma 7.5, only A operations that are immediately followed by I operations may not cause
Eve to answer a challenge. We now bound the number of such A operations.
Let d stand for the number of A operations that are immediately followed by I operations.
Thus d ≤ c and d ≤ b. Note that the length of the codeword is fixed, thus we must have a = b and
therefore d ≤ a. Thus we have
d ≤ (a+ b+ c)/3.
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Therefore the number of challenges that Eve successfully answers is at least
a+ b+ c− d ≥ 2(a+ b+ c)/3 ≥ 2eL/3.
Now let q ≥ 2eL/3 be the number of challenges that Eve successfully answers. Then the
probability that this happens is (let E0 be the event that is always true)
Pr[Eq] = Π
q
j=1 Pr[Hj |Ej−1].
Now if for some 1 ≤ j ≤ q−1 we have Pr[Ej ] ≤ 2−s, then we are already done because Pr[Eq] ≤
Pr[Ej ] ≤ 2−s. Otherwise by Lemma 7.6 we must have that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ q, Pr[Hj|Ej−1] < 2−ℓ.
Thus we have
Pr[Eq] = Π
q
j=1 Pr[Hj|Ej−1] < (2−ℓ)q ≤ (2−ℓ)2eL/3 = 2−Ω(d1) = 2−Ω(s).
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.8. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any k, n ∈ N with k ≥ log4 n and any ǫ >
0 with k ≥ C(log(1/ǫ)) there exists an explicit O((log n+log(1/ǫ))/
√
k) round privacy amplification
protocol for (n, k) sources with security parameter log(1/ǫ), entropy loss O(log n + log(1/ǫ)) and
communication complexity O((log n+ log(1/ǫ))
√
k).
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that ǫ < 2−Ω(
√
k), otherwise we can use the 2-round
protocol in Theorem 6.7. Now we show that the protocol in Figure 3 is such a protocol.
First, if Eve is passive then with probability 1 Alice and Bob agrees on the random string
W = W ′. Note that the random variables that contain information about X which are used
to authenticate Y are {Vi, V ′i , Ti, T ′i}, and the total size of these random variables is at most
L(8ℓ) = d1/(ρd2) · (8ℓ) < d1/ρ. Note that the random variable used to authenticate W ′ is R = R′,
which has size at most 4d1/ρ. Thus the total size of the random variables in the transcript that
contain information about X is at most 5d1/ρ = O(s). Thus we have that conditioned on the fixing
of (Y, {Mi, Vi, V ′i , Ti, T ′i , Yi2, Yi3,Wi}, R), the average conditional min-entropy of X is k−O(s), and
W is independent of X. Thus by Theorem 3.16 we have that RA = RB is 2
−s-close to being uniform
conditioned on all the transcript, and the entropy loss is O(s).
Next, if Eve is active and want to make RA 6= RB , then she has to change W ′ into a different
W . Now we have two cases. If Eve does not change Y , then we have Y = Y ′ and thus by by
Theorem 3.16 R = R′ and is 2−s-close to being private and uniform even conditioned on Y . Note
that conditioned on the fixing of Y , R = R′ is a deterministic function of X with size 4d1/ρ. Since
the total size of the random variables in the transcript up till now that contain information about
X is at most d1/ρ, by Lemma 3.9 the average conditional min-entropy of R is at least 3d1/ρ. Thus,
by Theorem 3.12 the probability that Eve can change W ′ into a different W without causing Alice
to reject is at most ρ/2 · 2−d1/ρ < 2−s. In the other case, by theorem 7.4 the probability that Eve
can successfully change Y into Y ′ 6= Y without causing either party to reject is at most 2−Ω(s).
Finally, if Bob does not reject then he computes his own RB = Ext1(X,W
′) where W ′ is a
random string sampled from his own random bits. Thus in this case we must have RB is 2
−s-close
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to being private and uniform. Thus we must have ∆((RB , E
′), (purify(RB), E′)) ≤ 2−s. Now if Eve
is passive then clearly RA is also 2
−s-close to being private and uniform. If Eve is active and does
not change Y , then by the above analysis if W ′ 6= W then Alice rejects with probability 1 − 2−s.
Now consider the probability that Alice rejects when Eve is active and changes Y . Let A stand for
the event that Alice rejects in this case, and B stand for the event that Bob rejects in this case.
By theorem 7.4 we have
Pr[B] + Pr[A|B¯] Pr[B¯] ≥ 1− 2−Ω(s).
Now if Bob rejects, then Bob will not send (W ′, T ′) to Alice. Thus in this case for Alice not to
reject, Eve has to come up with a string W and the correct tag T = MACR(W ) for Alice. Note
that in this case conditioned on the transcript, the average conditional min-entropy of R is still at
least 3d1/ρ. Thus by theorem 3.12 the probability that Eve can do this without causing Alice to
reject is at most 2−s. Thus we have
Pr[A|B] ≥ 1− 2−s.
Therefore
Pr[A] = Pr[A|B] Pr[B] + Pr[A|B¯] Pr[B¯] ≥ (1− 2−s) Pr[B] + Pr[A|B¯] Pr[B¯]
≥ (1− 2−s)(Pr[B] + Pr[A|B¯] Pr[B¯]) ≥ (1− 2−s)(1− 2−Ω(s))
≥ 1− 2−Ω(s).
Thus, in the case where Eve is active, Alice rejects with probability 1 − 2−Ω(s). Therefore we
must have ∆((RA, E
′), (purify(RA), E′)) ≤ 2−Ω(s). Now by choosing an appropriate s = O(log(1/ǫ))
we have that 2−Ω(s) ≤ ǫ and the entropy loss is O(log n + log(1/ǫ)). The number of rounds is
2(L + 1) = O(d1/d2) = O(s/ℓ) = O((log n + log(1/ǫ))/
√
k) and the communication complexity is
O(Ld22) = O(d1d2) = O((log n+ log(1/ǫ))
√
k).
8 Non-Malleable Condenser for Linear Min-Entropy
In this section we give a different non-malleable condenser for (n, k) sources with k = δn for any
constant 0 < δ < 1. This construction has the advantage that the security parameter can achieve
up to Ω(k) instead of Ω(
√
k). The basic ingredient is a modified alternating extraction protocol
borrowed from [Li12b].
Alternating Extraction. [Li12b] Assume that we have two parties, Quentin and Wendy.
Quentin has a source Q and a source S0 with entropy rate > 1/2. Wendy has a source X and
a source X¯ = (X1 ◦ · · · ◦ Xt). Suppose that (Q,S0) is kept secret from Wendy and (X, X¯) is
kept secret from Quentin. Let s, d be two parameters for the protocol. Let Extq, Extw, Extv be
seeded extractors as in Theorem 3.16. Let Raz be the two-source extractor in Theorem 3.17. The
alternating extraction protocol is an interactive process between Quentin and Wendy that runs in
t+ 1 steps.
In the 0’th step, Quentin sends S0 to Wendy, Wendy computes R0 = Raz(S0,X) and replies R0
to Quentin, Quentin then computes S1 = Extq(Q,R0). In this step R0, S1 each outputs d bits. In the
first step, Quentin sends S1 to Wendy, Wendy computes V1 = Extv(X1, S1) and R1 = Extw(X,S1).
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Quentin: Q,S0 Wendy: X, X¯ = (X1, · · · , Xt)
S0
S0−−−−−−−−→
R0←−−−−−−−− R0 = Raz(S0, X)
S1 = Extq(Q,R0)
S1−−−−−−−−→
R1←−−−−−−−− R1 = Extw(X,S1),
V1 = Extv(X1, S1)
· · ·
St = Extq(Q,Rt−1)
St−−−−−−−−→
Rt = Extw(X,St),
Vt = Extv(Xt, St)
Figure 4: Alternating Extraction.
She sends R1 to Quentin and Quentin computes S2 = Extq(Q,R1). In this step V1 outputs 2
t−1s
bits, and R1, S2 each outputs d bits. In each subsequent step i, Quentin sends Si to Wendy, Wendy
computes Vi = Extv(Xi, Si) and Ri = Extw(X,Si). She replies Ri to Quentin and Quentin computes
Si+1 = Extq(Q,Ri). In step i, Vi outputs 2
t−is bits, and Ri, Si+1 each outputs d bits. Thus, the
process produces the following sequence:
S0, R0 = Raz(S0,X), S1 = Extq(Q,R0),
V1 = Extv(X1, S1), R1 = Extw(X,S1), · · · ,
St = Extq(Q,Rt−1), Vt = Extv(Xt, St), Rt = Extw(X,St).
Look-Ahead Extractor. Let Y = (Q,S0) be a seed, the look-ahead extractor is defined as
laExt((X, X¯), Y )
def
= V1, · · · , Vt.
The following lemma is proved in [Li12b].
Lemma 8.1. [Li12b] In the alternating extraction protocol, assume that X has n bits and Q,Xi each
has at most n bits. Let d = O(log n+ s) > s be the number of random bits needed in Theorem 3.16
to achieve error 2−s. Let X¯ ′ = (X ′1 ◦ · · · ◦ X ′t) be another distribution on the same support of
X¯ and (Q′, S′0) be another distribution on the same support of (Q,S0) such that (Q,S0, Q
′, S′0) is
independent of (X, X¯, X¯ ′). Assume that X has min-entropy at least 2t(4s)+2td, Q has min-entropy
at least 4td+ 60d+ 6s and S0 is a (30d + 3s, 29d + 2s) source.
Now run the alternating extraction protocol with (X, X¯ ′) and (Q′, S′0) where in each step we
obtain S′i, R
′
i, V
′
i . For any i, 0 ≤ i ≤ t, let V iewi = (S0, · · · , Si, R0, · · · , Ri, V1, · · · , Vi) and let
V iew′i = (S
′
0, · · · , S′i, R′0, · · · , R′i, V ′1 , · · · , V ′i ). Then if for some j ≤ t, X¯j has min-entropy at least
2t(3s) + 2td, we have
(Vj, Sj , S
′
j , V iewj−1, V iew
′
j−1, Q,Q
′) ≈O(t2−s) (U2t−js, Sj, S′j , V iewj−1, V iew′j−1, Q,Q′).
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We now describe our non-malleable condenser.
Algorithm 8.2 (nmCond(x, y)).
Input: ℓ–an integer parameter. x — a sample from an (n, k)-source with k ≥ δn. y–an
independent random seed with y = (y1, y2).
Output: z — an m bit string.
Sub-Routines and Parameters:
Let d = O(log n+ℓ) be the length of a seed that can achieve error 2−5ℓ for both the non-malleable
extractor in Theorem 3.18 and the strong extractor in Theorem 3.16.
Let Cond : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}n′ )C be a rate-(δ → 0.9, 2−2ℓ)
-somewhere-condenser as in Theorem 3.15, where C = poly(1/δ), n′ = poly(δ)n.
Let nmExt : {0, 1}n′ × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m′ be a (0.8n′, 2−2ℓ)
-non-malleable extractor as in Theorem 3.18 with output length m′ = 6 · 2Cℓ.
Let y1 be a random string with d bits, y2 be a random string with d
′ = 4Cd+ 61d + 14ℓ bits.
Let nmExt2 : {0, 1}2C (10ℓ) × {0, 1}d′ → {0, 1}2C (4ℓ) be a (2C(10ℓ), 2−4ℓ)-non-malleable extractor
as in Theorem 3.18.
Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor defined above, with parameters (2ℓ, d) and using q = y2
and s0 is the first 30d + 6ℓ bits of y2.
1. Compute (x1, . . . xC) = Cond(x).
2. Compute w = Ext(x, y1) with output size 2
C(10ℓ).
3. Compute x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯C) where x¯i = nmExt(xi, y1).
4. Compute v = (v1, . . . , vC) = laExt((x, x¯), y2).
5. Output z = (nmExt2(w, y2), v) such that nmExt2(w, y2) has size 2
C(4ℓ).
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 8.3. For any constant 0 < δ < 1 and k = δn there exists a constant C1 = 2
poly(1/δ) such
that given any 0 < s ≤ k/C1, the above construction is a (k, s, 2−s)-non-malleable condenser with
seed length poly(1/δ)(log n+ s).
Proof. Let A be any (deterministic) function such that ∀y ∈ Supp(Y ),A(y) 6= y. We will show that
for most y, with high probability over the fixing of nmCond(X,A(y)), nmCond(X, y) is still close
to having min-entropy at least ℓ. Let Y ′ = A(Y ). Thus Y ′ 6= Y . In the following analysis we will
use letters with prime to denote the corresponding random variables produced with Y ′ instead of
Y . Let H = nmExt2(W,Y2). Thus Z = (H,V ). We have the following two cases.
Case 1: Y1 = Y
′
1 . In this case, since Y
′ 6= Y , we must have that Y2 6= Y ′2 . Now by Theorem 3.16
we have that
(W,Y1) ≈2−5ℓ (U, Y1).
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Therefore, we can now fix Y1 (and thus Y
′
1), and with probability 1 − 2−ℓ over this fixing, W
is 2−4ℓ-close to uniform. Moreover, after this fixing W is a deterministic function of X and thus is
independent of Y2. Note also that after this fixing, Y
′
2 is a deterministic function of Y2. Thus by
Theorem 3.18 we have that
(H,H ′, Y2, Y ′2) ≈O(2−4ℓ) (U2C(4ℓ),H ′, Y2, Y ′2).
Therefore, we can now further fix Y2 (and thus Y
′
2) and with probability at least 1−O(2−ℓ) over
this fixing, (H,H ′) is 2−3ℓ-close to (U2C(4ℓ),H ′). Thus we can further fix H ′, and with probability
at least 1−2−ℓ over this fixing, H is 2−2ℓ-close to uniform. Now note that H has size 2C(4ℓ) and V ′
has size at most 2C(2ℓ). Thus by Lemma 3.21, we can further fix V ′, and with probability at least
1− 2 · 2−ℓ over this fixing, V1 is 2ℓ-close to having min-entropy at least 2C(4ℓ) − 2C(2ℓ)− ℓ ≥ 3ℓ.
Thus in this case we have shown that, with probability 1 − O(2−ℓ) over the fixing of Y , with
probability 1−O(2−ℓ) over the fixing of Z ′, Z is 2−ℓ-close to having min-entropy at least 3ℓ > 2ℓ.
Case 2: Y1 6= Y ′1 . In this case, first note that by Theorem 3.15, Cond(X) = (X1, . . . XC) is 2−ℓ-
close to a somewhere rate-0.9-source with C rows, and each row has length Ω(n). In the following
we will simply treat it as a somewhere rate-0.9-source, since this only adds 2−ℓ to the error. We
assume that Xg, 1 ≤ g ≤ C is a rate 0.9-source 2.
Now since the adversary changes Y1 to Y
′
1 6= Y1, by Theorem 3.18 we have that
(X¯g, X¯
′
g, Y1) ≈2−2ℓ (Um′ , X¯ ′g, Y1).
As the first step for the following analysis, we now fix Y1, Y
′
1 andW
′ = Ext(X,Y ′1), X¯
′
g. Note that
Y ′1 is a deterministic function of (Y1, Y2), and after fixing Y
′
1 , (W
′, X¯ ′g) is a deterministic function
of X. Thus by Lemma 3.9 we have the following claim.
Claim 8.4. After the fixings of (Y1, Y
′
1 ,W
′, X¯ ′g), X¯g is a deterministic function of X and is 2−ℓ
close to a source with average conditional min-entropy m′ − 2C(4ℓ).
Note that by Lemma 3.9, after this fixing, the average conditional min-entropy of X is at least
k − m′ − 2C(4ℓ) and m′ = poly(δ)n. Thus for a sufficiently small ℓ = Ω(k) we can ensure that
k−m′−2C(4ℓ) ≥ 2C(8ℓ)+2Cd and m′−2C(4ℓ) ≥ 2C(6ℓ)+2Cd. Since Y1 is independent of Y2 and
Y ′1 is a deterministic function of (Y1, Y2), by Lemma 3.19 we have that with probability 1− 2 · 2−2ℓ
over this fixing, Q = Y2 is a source with min-entropy at least 4Cd+ 60d + 12ℓ and S0 is a source
with min-entropy 29d+ 4ℓ. Now by Lemma 8.1 (and note that s = 2ℓ) we have that
(Vg, Sg, S
′
g, V iewg−1, V iew
′
g−1, Y2, Y
′
2) ≈O(C2−2ℓ) (U2C−g(2ℓ), Sg, S′g, V iewg−1, V iew′g−1, Y2, Y ′2).
Adding back all the error, and noticing that we have fixed (Y1, Y
′
1 ,W
′, X¯ ′g) before, we have
(Vg, Sg, S
′
g, V iewg−1, V iew
′
g−1,W
′, X¯ ′g, Y1, Y
′
1 , Y2, Y
′
2)
≈O(C2−2ℓ)(U2C−g(2ℓ), Sg, S′g, V iewg−1, V iew′g−1,W ′, X¯ ′g, Y1, Y ′1 , Y2, Y ′2).
Note that V ′g = Extv(X¯ ′g, S′g) and H ′ = nmExt2(W ′, Y ′2). Thus we have that
2In general a somewhere rate-0.9-source is a convex combination of elementary somewhere rate-0.9-sources, but
without loss of generality we can assume it is an elementary somewhere rate-0.9-source.
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(Vg, V iew
′
g−1,H
′, V ′g , Y ) ≈O(C2−2ℓ) (U2C−g(2ℓ), V iew′g−1,H ′, V ′g , Y ).
This implies that
(Vg,H
′, V ′1 , · · · , V ′g , Y ) ≈O(C2−2ℓ) (U2C−g(2ℓ),H ′, V ′1 , · · · , V ′g , Y ).
Thus we have that with probability 1−O(C2−ℓ/2) over the fixing of Y ,
(Vg,H
′, V ′1 , · · · , V ′g) ≈2−3ℓ/2 (U2C−g(2ℓ),H ′, V ′1 , · · · , V ′g).
Thus, with probability 1 − 2−ℓ/2 over the further fixing of (H ′, V ′1 , · · · , V ′g), we have Vg ≈2−ℓ
U2C−g(2ℓ). Now note the size of (V
′
g+1, · · · , V ′C) is at most
∑C
i=g+1 2
C−i(2ℓ) = 2C−g(2ℓ) − 2ℓ, and
that Vg has size 2
C−g(2ℓ). Thus by Lemma 3.21, with probability 1 − 2 · 2−ℓ/2 over the further
fixing of (V ′g+1, · · · , V ′C), we have that Vg is 2−ℓ/2-close to a source with min-entropy 2ℓ− ℓ/2 > ℓ.
Since V ′ = (V ′1 , · · · , V ′g , V ′g+1, · · · , V ′C) and Z ′ = (H ′, V ′), altogether in this case we have that with
probability 1−O(C2−ℓ/2) over the fixing of Y , with probability 1− 2−ℓ/2 over the further fixing of
Z ′, Vg is 2−ℓ/2-close to a source with min-entropy > ℓ. Thus Z is also 2−ℓ/2-close to a source with
min-entropy > ℓ.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2, and notice that the fraction of “bad seeds” that an adversary
can achieve is at most the sum of the fraction of bad seeds in both cases. Thus we have that with
probability 1 − O(C2−ℓ/2) over the fixing of Y , with probability 1 − 2−ℓ/2 over the further fixing
of Z ′, Z is 2−ℓ/2-close to a source with min-entropy > ℓ. by choosing an appropriate ℓ = O(s)
we have that the construction is a (k, s, 2−s)-non-malleable condenser with seed length O(Cd) =
poly(1/δ)(log n+ s).
Combining this theorem with Theorem 6.5, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 8.5. There exists an absolute constant C0 > 1 such that for any constant 0 < δ < 1
and k = δn there exists a constant C1 = 2
poly(1/δ) such that given any ǫ > 0 with C1 log(1/ǫ) ≤ k,
there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol for (n, k) sources with security param-
eter log(1/ǫ), entropy loss C0(log n + log(1/ǫ)) and communication complexity poly(1/δ)(log n +
log(1/ǫ)).
9 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this paper we construct explicit non-malleable condensers for arbitrary min-entropy, and use
them to give an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss for arbi-
trary min-entropy k, with security parameter up to s = Ω(
√
k). This is the first explicit protocol
that simultaneously achieves optimal parameters in both round complexity and entropy loss, for
arbitrary min-entropy.
We then generalize this result to give a privacy amplification protocol that runs in O(s/
√
k)
rounds and achieves optimal entropy loss for arbitrary min-entropy k, with security parameter up
to s = Ω(k). This significantly improves the protocol in [CKOR10]. In the special case where
k = δn for some constant δ > 0, we give better non-malleable condensers and a 2-round privacy
amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss for security parameter up to s = Ω(k), which
improves the entropy loss and communication complexity of the 2-round protocol in [Li12b].
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Some open problems include constructing better non-malleable extractors or non-malleable
condensers, and to construct optimal privacy amplification protocols for security parameter bigger
than
√
k. Another interesting problem is to find other applications of non-malleable extractors or
non-malleable condensers.
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